University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

ScholarWorks@UARK
Graduate Theses and Dissertations
12-2016

An Investigation into Hybrid Models of Mindreading: A Dual Type
Theory Account
Alexandra Jewell
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd
Part of the Cognition and Perception Commons, and the Philosophy of Mind Commons

Citation
Jewell, A. (2016). An Investigation into Hybrid Models of Mindreading: A Dual Type Theory Account.
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Retrieved from https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/1783

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more
information, please contact scholar@uark.edu.

An Investigation into Hybrid Models of Mindreading:
A Dual Type Theory Account

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in Philosophy

by

Alexandra Duree Jewell
University of Arkansas
Bachelor of Arts in Psychology, 2014

December 2016
University of Arkansas

This thesis is approved for recommendation to the Graduate Council.

___________________________________
Dr. Jack Lyons
Thesis Director

____________________________________
Eric M. Funkhouser
Committee Member

____________________________________
Warren Herold
Committee Member

Abstract
Mindreading, or attributing mental states to others, involves instances of simulation and theory;
but there is controversy over which one of these methods is the primary, or default, mechanism. I
propose that mindreading is a theory-based process, such that we utilize theory over simulation
when both are available and reliable. To argue my position, I suggest that theory has been
inaccurately portrayed in past discussion and that we possess two types: a connectionist network
(tt1) and a traditional, conceptual folk-psychology (tt2). By dividing theory in this way, we can
explain common phenomena of mindreading that other theory-based accounts do not explicitly
imply. Previously used as evidence for a simulation-based model, these phenomena are now
compatible with a Dual Type Theory Account. Additionally, the distinction between type 1 and
type 2 theory invites a new argument for primacy by appealing to the cognitive resources
required by a mechanism, such that the primary method will be the one that requires the least
amount of effort and is available in every case. Since tt1 is effortless and automatic, it is likely
the default process. Tt1 provides us with a modular, fast, unconscious mindreading tool that is
not dependent on conceptual knowledge, yet it can be influenced and adjusted by tt2 via
supervised learning.
Keywords: mindreading, theory, simulation, hybrid account, default mechanism,
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1
An Investigation into Hybrid Models of Mindreading:
A Dual Type Theory Account
Human beings have the capability to attribute emotions and beliefs to others with decent
accuracy, such that we can interact successfully in our environment most of the time. For
example, we can correctly identify when an individual is upset and even assign reasons behind
another’s actioni; and this attribution influences our beliefs and behaviors toward the other
person. But what mechanism is underlying this phenomenon and how might that mechanism be
playing its role? In fact, there are most likely different tools we can utilize to accomplish this
feat, different ways of concluding some state which we believe another to have. Typically, there
are two types of mechanisms: those which incorporate theory and those that do not. The former
group fall under Theory Theory (henceforth TT), whereas the latter are generally members of
Simulation Theory (henceforth ST). While classically it was believed that humans use one type
of mechanism, with philosophers advocating for it exclusively over the other, currently there is
growing popularity in holding a hybrid model, in which an individual utilizes both types of
mechanisms in different situations; but even in these hybrid accounts, one mechanism is favored,
or considered default, over the other— meaning it is primary, chosen most often, chosen when
all mechanisms are available. I also hold a hybrid model and aim to show, by introducing a Dual
Type Theoryii Account, that our default mechanism for mindreading is theory. I believe this new
account can explain aspects of the phenomenon, which previously have been cited as evidence
for a simulation-based account, as well as approach this discussion from a new perspective to
determine the default mechanism.
While there are many hybrid models, mine differs from others by distinguishing between
two types of theory, that is two types of mechanism used to mindread that utilize a theory. I
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believe this distinction might illuminate theory as the default mechanism that humans use to
attribute high-level mental states, like complex emotionsiii, desires, and beliefs, etc. to others.
The inaccurate grouping of both types of theory into one might be a contributing factor that leads
some authors to favor simulation as default. Some aspects cannot be explained by appealing to
one type of theory alone, but by identifying the two types we can explain evidence originally
understood as supporting simulation. These phenomena are no longer the strong evidence that
simulation-advocates argue it is since it is also compatible with a Dual Type Theory Account.
Additionally, I will provide reasons why we should believe theory to be the primary tool for this
task: some reasons that, to my best knowledge, have not been addressed beforeiv.
I will begin by discussing what is meant by mindreading, theory, and simulation
according to the literature as well as mentioning relevant topics that will support my view. By
identifying the related debates will we see the potential problems that have led me to hold that
two types of theory exist and that one is default to the other and simulation. However, both
theories along with instances of simulation can work together and have the ability to increase the
accuracy of our mindreading capacity. We will examine some current models of hybrid accounts
and unpack what authors mean by suggesting one is default, or primary, above another
mechanism. We shall see that some of the reasons that authors like Goldman use to argue
simulation as primary are not enough to support this claim since they are compatible on my view
and could even be used to argue the opposite.
I will discuss the ways in which humans make these judgments regarding the mental
states of others, the underlying mechanisms, and the connections that exist among said
mechanisms. It is my goal to demonstrate that a hybrid model based on the Dual Type Theory
Account explains different features of the mindreading phenomenon, such as the developmental

3
aspect, egocentric bias, and even instances of implicit bias; and it is also compatible with what
we know about humans being cognitive misers and the demands on cognitive resources of
different processes (to be discussed later). Within this account I will argue that type 1 theory
(henceforth tt1) is, in fact, our default mechanism when assigning mental states to others because
it is the mechanism that requires the least amount of resources, followed by the other tools:
simulation and type 2 theory (henceforth tt2). Because I am dissecting theory in this way, I ought
to discuss the connection between these different processes and the influence tt2 has on tt1, in
addition to the role simulation plays within this phenomenon. When distinguishing between
different types of processes and examining the characteristics that accompany the distinction, I
will suggest that simulation either is a type 2 process or does not fit precisely into these
categories: regardless, this suggestion might imply that we need to clarify our definitions or that
these processes’ features are not as clustered as previously believed.
Terminology
Mindreading
Mindreading, or ‘Theory of Mind,’ is the cognitive ability to attribute mental states to
others, that is, the way in which people conclude what another person is feeling or believing.
This phenomenon is pervasive in human activity as we must assume what others are thinking or
feeling to interact with them appropriately. How might we know to comfort someone’s sadness
unless we have some way of attributing that mental state based on her appearance or situation via
a mechanism that incorporates such information in order to conclude what she is likely feeling?
Also, we care to explain or predict others’ behavior since it might affect us.
We come to know our own mental states through introspection; we are capable of
identifying our current emotions and beliefs because this type of knowledge is transparent to usv.
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Often, reflection can illuminate one’s reasons for behaving a certain way or feeling a certain
way. But the mental states of another are not readily available like those of our own.
Nevertheless, we still engage in trying to identify and assign mental states to others because we
know that other people are like us, and just as we have mental states, they must have beliefs,
desires, and emotions that can explain behavior.
There are many instances of mindreading, that is, there are many cases of attributing
various mental states to others, such that humans must have different mechanisms that can
complete the varying tasks. Because these cases are so different we should take a hybrid account,
one that incorporates simulation and theory, seriously. For example, to attribute an emotion like
sadness to someone is very different than attributing a belief about what a person will do or what
she believes, yet both are cases of mindreading. If an individual is seen with disappointed eyes
and lips curled down into a frown, most of us would believe her to be sad and attribute sadness
based on her appearance. But this case is different than attributing some mental state to her such
as a belief, desire, or consequential action. In cases of beliefs, etc., appearance alone does not
suffice in giving us the relevant information to accurately attribute the target’s mental state. I am
interested in the mechanism used in the latter type of mindreading, one that incorporates more
than just appearances and is capable of assigning higher-level representational states to others.
Because types of cases are so different, most theory of mind proposals have two or more systems
or levels; however, the way to separate between the types differs among models. Distinguishing
among types of mindreading is crucial in identifying which mechanisms are responsible for
attributing different kinds of mental states; a mechanism used for one level might not be default
for the other level. We can start by analyzing the division offered by Goldman (2006), which
distinguishes between low-level and high-level simulation based on nonpropositional vs.
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propositional content. Although this distinction is used to explain the differences specifically in
terms of simulation, we can use the qualifications of his bi-level model to understand
mindreading in general, despite the mechanism we believe to be responsible.
Similar to Goldman’s partition is that of Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan (2000), which
distinguishes between a “social cognitive” and a “social perceptual” component. The cognitive
includes understanding the mind as a representational system, whereas the latter involves
perception of biological and intentional behavior and recognition of emotions from facial
expressions. These components map onto Goldman’s high-level and low-level systems
respectively (Goldman & Jordan, 2013). Low-level mindreading, which is stimulus driven,
consists of mindreading nonpropositional states, such as sadness. The other level, high-level
mindreading, is concerned with attitudes, beliefs, desires, and other propositional states, and this
kind is the focus of this discussion. What process is default when attributing mental states such
as beliefs to others? My view is more in line with the separation of Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan,
rather than Goldman, since I am arguing that high-level is still stimulus-driven in a way, in that
my default mechanism automatically occurs in the presence of a stimulus; but unlike low-level
processes, it is concerned with beliefs, desires, etc. The mechanism incorporates more than
mimicking perceptual cues of a target (as Goldman describes low-level simulation). High-level
type of mindreading seems very different than the low-level or surface level attributions
(propositional vs. nonpropositional), therefore this difference may lead be a good reason to
believe the mechanisms behind the different kinds of attributions are not the same.
As aforementioned, the phenomenon of mindreading is complex; and there is growing
support for hybrid theories, which include some cases being carried out by TT type, informationrich processes while some are simulated by information-poor processesvi. I also hold a hybrid
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account, and so believe there are instances where simulation is the mechanism used to mindread,
however I will argue that theory is default for high-level attribution. Even though it is not the
focus of this paper, I would like to point out that low-level mindreading is one such instance in
which simulation (something other than theory) is the tool for attribution. Goldman (2006)
discusses the mirror-based mechanism responsible for low-level mindreading, such that when
perceiving a person who is sad and exhibiting certain facial expressions, mirror neurons aid in
replicating the exact state to accurately attribute nonpropositional states of this kind.
The overwhelming evidence of mirror-neurons and the studies that demonstrate this type
of low-level mindreading suggest that Goldman is correct in proposing that such mindreadingnonpropositional, stimulus driven, perceptual- is a result of simulation via mirroring. When we
see someone exhibiting sad facial expressions, we mimic those expressions, which ultimately
leads us to conclude the sadness we attribute to the target. We unconsciously recreate the exact
state we attribute to her by simulating the same state, which we see. Within my hybrid account, I
do not reject that low-level mindreading is executed via mirror neurons, which is a type of
simulation. However, I disagree with Goldman that our use of mirror neurons to mindread lowlevel cases is strong support for simulation of different kinds (specifically imagination) being
default for high-level mindreading (2006). The cases are so different. It is not obvious that a nontheory mechanism or mimicking mechanism must be the tool used in both. While I concede that
low-level mindreading is obtained via simulation (mirror neurons), I disagree that simulation
(imagination) is the default mechanism behind high-level mindreading. Both instances of
simulation aim at recreating the state of the target; but the differences in low-level and high-level
cannot support a non-theory mechanism being default for high-level just because it is the tool in
low-level mindreading. To better understand the default process of high-level mindreading, we
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shall focus on the specifics of each mechanism and identity which one is the primary, automatic
tool to attribute propositional states to others, such that we successfully interact with each other
and the environment.
Theory
The dominant view for explaining most cognitive abilities is to propose an internal
knowledge or theory, a set of rules that guides cognition; this similar strategy was believed to be
responsible for mindreading (Fodor 1987, Sellars, 1963; as cited in Stich & Nichols, 1992). In
this view, the internally represented knowledge, known as “folk-psychology,” which is partly
accessible to consciousness but more often not, is the underlying mechanism responsible for
guiding our attributions of mental states and predictions of behavior to others. This knowledge is
not concerning our own mental processes but those of other people. Some who hold this view
consider the information used in mindreading to be similar to the knowledge structure found in a
scientific theory and is acquired and utilized in much of the same way (Stich & Nichols, 2003).
When I refer to “folk-psychology” for the remainder of this discussion, I am referring to the
traditional, sentence-like, rule-based, internally represented, conceptual knowledge of other
people’s psychology. This traditional type of account is information-rich since it relies on vast
knowledge of the minds of others, that is, in order for an individual to attribute certain mental
states to others, she has to possess general knowledge of human psychology and have concepts
pertaining to the mental states and beliefs that others might have. However, this dependence on
an information-rich theory is a downfall of traditional theory, and I propose an alternative
account of theory, such that this constant reliance on conceptual knowledge is not necessary.
A potential problem that arises when considering traditional TT to be the only framework
available to individuals is childhood error especially the false-belief taskvii, such that a child
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inaccurately attributes belief states to others based on the attributor’s knowledge, which the
target does not possess, but that she does not disregard. This type of problem also addresses the
question of acquisition, how a child comes to possess this internally represented information,
which changes as a child develops. That is that the concepts children have regarding the mental
states of others gain sophistication as the child gets older, and some of these childhood errors
decrease as she gets older. Two solutions from TT proponents include the child scientist theory
and the modularity theory. According to the former, children are like scientist, who refine their
theories during childhood and acquire folk-psychology like other learned scientific theories. In
response to childhood error, as children gain more theories and concepts they begin to replace
the non-representational theory with a representational one that allows them to conceptualize and
avoid the false-belief problem. Modularity theorists propose that children are not developing or
refining their theory as child-scientist theorists state, but rather the theory is innate of ‘modules’
and limitedly interacts with information from other components (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Scholl &
Leslie, 1999). Since the theory is innate, these theorists explain the error as a result of the
selection-processor failing to inhibit truths about the world when selecting inputs for the
inference mechanism, but as a child develops she gets better at inhibition. I propose a modulartype theory but non-nativist; a theory that exhibits other aspects of modules, like automaticity
and effortlessness, but it can modularize new information. Humans have an innate capacity to
mindread; but modulation can also occur where learning, both from environmental inputs and
conceptual knowledge, can overlearn our modules, and new connections become automatic. This
type of learning will be discussed in further detail.
How might the mechanism based on traditional TT proceed? As previously stated, the
more seasoned models include knowledge structures, on which the attributor relies when
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ascribing mental states to others. The reason for the popularity of this type of model stems from
similar ones explaining other cognitive capacities through explicit rules or sentence-like
principles (Stich & Nichols, 1992). Goldman and Jordan (2013) provide a description of what
mindreading via traditional TT might include when attributing a decision or plan to some target.
For example, to predict which donut shop Donna will go to, a person incorporates beliefs
attributed to Donna as well as aspects of general human psychology (folk-psychology) and feeds
those inputs into the attributor’s own theoretical reasoning mechanism or inference mechanism.
If we know that Donna desires donuts, and she believes the best donuts are from DonutDisturb,
we then possess two beliefs specifically about Donna. More precisely, we possess two
metarepresentational beliefs about Donna, that is, we have beliefs about what Donna believes.
Additionally, we have a general belief about human psychology that tells us that people will
most likely do the thing that will satisfy their desires. When we feed these three beliefs into our
inference or theoretical reasoning mechanism, we are left with the output that Donna will go to
DonutDisturb, and thus designate this future behavior to her. See Figure 1. An important aspect
of this TT process is that the attributable states are metarepresentational belief states of the
target. The metarepresentational characteristic of this state is important when we consider selfreflection, its role in tagging a state as metarepresentational, and its occurrence during
mindreading tasks (to be discussed later). Additionally important, the processor relied upon to
produce the conclusion or the attributable mental state is only the theoretical reasoning
mechanism or inference mechanism of the attributor.
The inference mechanism used to extract the relevant information from our internalized
theory of mind is similar to that of other theories like folk-physics. We have such mechanisms
that are capable of computing the internalized theories like folk-physics, so it is plausible that the
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same tool can be used with respect to our folk-psychology and selects the elements to be
considered during mindreading, that is, the relevant theories. However, while traditional TT has
a mechanism “for free,” a mechanism that we have available and use often, it relies on some
encoded or represented generalizations or regularities of folk-psychology (Stich & Nichols,
1992). This reliance on elaborate information is a common critique for traditional TT, as
simulationists often attack it as being too complex and offer simulation as a simpler explanation;
however, simulation may not be as easy as they claimviii.
If mindreading does occur through accessing internalized information regarding other
peoples’ minds, then the accuracy of the attribution relies on the folk-psychology on which the
attributor appeals to. If the attributor utilizes a bad theory of human psychology, then she will be
more likely to produce an incorrect conclusion and thus an inaccurate reading of the target. Say
for example that in her folk-psychology an individual has the belief that a person will choose the
closest option instead of the desired option to satisfy her needs. If this belief is fed into the
theoretical reasoning mechanism along with the beliefs specific to Donna, then the attributor may
conclude that Donna will go to DonutHut, which is significantly lower in appeal and taste but
closer to Donna. If this later belief about general human psychology is false, then the attribution
has a higher potential to be inaccurate. Therefore, the content of the knowledge relied upon
within the TT framework guides the accuracy of the attribution.
Connectionist Networks. There has been a divergence from the sentence-like idea of
knowledge structure, and instead a connectionist model has increased support when considering
the internal database (Churchland, 1981 & 1989). Oversimplifying a great deal, connectionism is
the view that the mind has networks consisting of many units, or nodes, and the connections
among them depend on the weight or strength between the nodesix, so that certain ones are
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activated given the activation others. Connectionist models state that the weights among the
nodes play a role when making predictions based on this information, that is, the knowledge of
the regularities of the world are represented by the strengths between nodes, such that we do not
need a sentence-like theory to represent the world. I will not be offering arguments for this type
of processing but such arguments have been given, for example, by Smolensky (1988b) and
Chalmers (1990).
These two different portrayals of the knowledge structures may cause confusion when
considering what should be included as “theory.” For example, if theory is meant to suggest
sentence-like rules or principles, then the connectionist network would not be included in a true
internally represented theory of knowledge. On the other hand, if we use “theory” in a wide or
liberal sense, then any type of internal information concerning a certain subject should encode a
tacit theory (Stich & Nichols, 1992). I prefer to consider “theory” in this wide sense, and thus
propose a theory of internal knowledge that includes connections of nodes and weights among
them that influence which bits of knowledge are more salient or relied upon more often.
As opposed to conceptual representation like that in the traditional theory or folkpsychology, connectionists claim that information is stored within the weights, or connection
strengths, between the nodes of a network; and the information stored as weights is nonsymbolic. These types of neural nets do not follow strict rules like that of propositional,
traditional theory, instead they respond to statistical patterns. It is not obvious that this type of
information, the weighted nodes that connect the input and output, is accessible to consciousness,
but it is certainly nonconceptual in general. If our mindreading is composed of a connectionist
network, the presence of a folk-psychology becomes questionable. Again, on the wider
interpretation of “theory” we are not limited to the sentence-like representation; and other
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theory-theorists have cited the connectionist networks as included in what they mean by stating
“theory.” However, if the connectionist networks include aspects that are nonconceptual then
perhaps we do not possess a conceptual folk-psychology, instead the theory is just a modular
response based on nonconceptual weighted nodes that connect the input (say for instance an
observed behavior) and some output (attributed desire). A folk-psychology is not necessary
considering the network reflects the environment by adjusting weights, which are all
nonconceptual. For example, if we witness a person hit another, we will most likely attribute
anger to the aggressor. How do we go about making that attribution according to the different
ideas of theory? If we use sentence-like, propositional beliefs concerning the psychology of
others, we probably refer to our belief that “most people who do violence are angry.” However,
if we use some connectionist network, which relies on the weights that are based on probability
given past experience, then maybe we do not need that belief at all. The belief is unnecessary
because our connectionist network automatically reaches the likely output of anger considering
the inputs, and the network has been wired to reliably reflect instances of violence and anger.
What I mean is that our network is wired such that it is not necessary to access some
symbolically-represented, propositional knowledge because the automatic, connectionist network
already reflects that knowledge. When we saw instances of anger in the past, there was violence.
And when we saw violence, we found that it was caused by anger. And so, the probability of
anger being the cause of the perceived violence increased within our network; thus, in future
cases of violence the output to be attributed will be anger. The positive weight between the nodes
increased, so that the knowledge that anger causes violence rests in the strength of the nodes
between the input (violence) and the output (anger); and the theory that anger causes violence is
represented by that connectionist network.
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If the knowledge or theory is encoded, in response to regularities in the environment,
within the weights or strengths among the nodes in the connectionist network, then it is
nonconceptual, specifically state-nonconceptual. It still represents the world, only the subject
does not have to have the concepts needed to express the content (Evans, 1982). Evans (1982)
argues that nonconceptual mental states are unconscious but become conscious when they serve
as inputs to another system, such as a reasoning system; this is consistent with the idea that type
1 processes, like tt1, operate unconsciously, and we are only aware of the output of the
processing (Bargh, 1994). It seems that this is the case with intuitive responses regarding
mindreading; the intermediate nodes of the network are not consciously accessible to us, but the
final outputs are because they are attributed to the targetx.
The nonconceptuality of the connectionist nodes needs to be addressed. Based on the
distinction between state and content nonconceptuality from Heck (2000), the latter claims that
the content of propositional attitudes and beliefs must be a different type of content than that of
nonpropositional states; on the other hand, the former does not require more than one type of
content. A connectionist network responsive to statistical probabilities and not dependent on the
concepts a person possesses, could still potentially share content with that of propositional states,
and will, in such a case, be state nonconceptual. I am going to assume that since the system can
undergo the process without necessarily possessing the concepts, it is state nonconceptual; but I
think that the content could be specified if the person possessed the concept, so I am not going to
conclude content nonconceptuality from state nonconceptuality as some other authors do (Heck,
2007).
A network that is developed in a bottom-up, or stimulus-driven, way is independent of
concepts and would be both synchronically and diachronically state nonconceptual, at no point is
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it relying on concepts to be in the state that it is in. The fact that it is stimulus-driven does not
entail that it applies to low-level mindreading because the information it represents reflects
people’s beliefs, desires, etc. Although typically nonconceptual, if the connectionist networks of
our mindreading module (tt1) are susceptible to supervised learning, by which conceptual
information (tt2) alters the weights among the nodes in a given network by making relevant
information available to the module, then tt1 would be dependent on concepts; and therefore, the
connectionist network theory is synchronically state-nonconceptual but diachronically
conceptual.
There could be propositional information which is the same as, or could accurately
specify, the information stored in the weights among nodes, hence why it is state and not content
nonconceptual. For example, in the violence and anger connection as stated above, one could
hold the belief that anger causes people to be violent while also having a connection network that
generates the output “anger” when it has the input “violence.” And since the content of the
network and the propositional knowledge can overlap, if the network is susceptible to supervised
learning, then it is possible that conceptual information may come into play within the
connectionist network. While connectionist networks do not have to rely on concepts, the theory
of connectionist networks that I am proposing can be affected by conceptual information, which
might alter the strengths among the nodes at some point.
Some might argue (Eliminativists) that connectionism is responsible for mental states as
opposed to folk-psychology, and beliefs and desires don’t really exist, thus that folk-psychology
doesn’t exist (Churchland, 1981 & 1989). Again, a “folk-psychology,” as I am using it, is the
base of conceptual knowledge concerning the mental states and psychological processes of other
people. This is not knowledge regarding my own mind, but the minds of others, and is usually
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defined as internally represented information. However, I do not think this is the case; I do not
think we have to sacrifice one theory for another. By identifying the nodes of connectionist
networks as nonconceptual, as nets that respond to statistical patterns, they lose the necessity of
concepts, that is, they lose the conceptuality aspect of the symbolic representation that is needed
to possess a folk-psychology: conceptual information regarding the minds of others, but they
retain the information or knowledge. Even though this folk-psychology is not present in the
neural net, I think we still possess it.
The knowledge stored nonconceptually in the neural nets of tt1, can also be symbolically
represented as conceptual, propositional knowledge regarding the minds of others in tt2. One
reason why I believe we have this conceptual information is our ability to use it to change our
connectionist networks. As stated before, connectionist nets are synchronically statenonconceptual, but conceptual information can guide which nodes are strengthened by selecting
the correct output for a certain input and making that knowledge available to tt1xi. In this way,
networks depend on the concept while the weights are being tuned over many trials. The altered
network reflects the chosen propositional information by the strengths between the input and
output (again, think of the violence and anger example); and since this type of development of
the connectionist network occurred via conceptual information, the network is now
diachronically state conceptual. According to Stich and Nichols (1992), predictions of behavior
and other high-level attributions are ‘cognitively penetrable,’ meaning they can be influenced by
new theories learned by the attributor. They offer an example in which people are asked what
sample they would prefer if given two of the same item. Some people, unaware of a certain
psychological trendxii, answered that they would choose at random; however, this is not what
happens during an actual experiment. The wrong answer shows they are operating with an
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incorrect theory when predicting behavior; and subjects who do know the theory about the
psychological trend are more likely to answer appropriately, that is, accurately predict what they
would do. This discrepancy demonstrates that our attributions and predictions are responsive to
theories of folk-psychology and can change depending on learning a new theory. Therefore, we
should not eliminate traditional folk-psychology on the basis that connectionist networks are also
relied upon as theory when mindreading, because both tt2 and tt1 are included within the
information that a person can use in order to mindread and increase accuracy of mindreading.
Upon learning an improved theory, a person can train her tt1 over time to reflect that knowledge,
making her tt1 more reliable. So, I propose a new TT, one that incorporates a bi-level, that is,
two types of theory that are both accessed and incorporated within the phenomenon of
mindreading: a folk-psychology (tt2) and a connectionist network (tt1). By incorporating both
theories within a theory-based hybrid account, we will be able to address certain aspects of
mindreading that may have led some to believe simulation is default over theory. This Dual Type
Theory will attempt to explain the phenomenon while arguing for the connectionist network
type-theory (tt1) being the default, or primary, mechanism individuals use to attribute high-level
mental states to others on the grounds that this mechanism requires the least amount of cognitive
resources.
Dual Type Theory. The clash between the traditional view and connectionist view of
theory does not guarantee that one is incorrect about the mind. Authors argue that in many
domains and for a variety of cognitive tasks people can utilize different types of processes, which
are often divided between rule-based processing and associative processing (Chaiken & Trope,
1999). Under dual process theories the two paradigms could both be descriptive of the same
mind, that is, the mind can be both symbolic and possess connection networks with respect to the
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same task. Similarly, my view is that we can have both processes with regard to mindreading,
such that a person can attribute mental states to others through use of connectionist networks,
which is the default mechanism, but may also access the rule-based, symbolic theory and can use
the latter to alter the former.
Dissecting theory in this way, suggesting that there are two different types, maps on to
the distinction between type1/type2 processes of cognition and the associated features; therefore,
I am proposing that traditional folk-psychology (tt2) resembles type 2 processing while a
connectionist network theory (tt1) is a type 1 process. Better known as the distinction between
system1/system 2xiii, the two types have clusters of features that are characteristic to each, so it
should be easy to identify a process as either type 1 or type 2, and classifying the mechanisms in
this way might elucidate different aspects within the mindreading phenomenon like the question
of primacy. I am not claiming that all dual-process theories are the same or share these exact
defining features; however, many of them do, and for the sake of time I will simplify the main
aspects and assumptions of the models.
Sometimes referred to as system 1 and 2, following Stanovich (1999), or old and new
mind (Evans, 2010b; Stanovich, 2004), dual-process theories propose that two different
processes can be used to complete the same objective with respect to a number of cognitive
tasks. The two types of processes can be characterized with defining features such as, type 1
being more intuitive, not requiring working memory, and autonomous; while type 2 is reflective,
requires working memory, and involves cognitive decoupling (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Along
with the defining characteristics, Evans and Stanovich (2013) propose additional, typical features
of each processing mode as followsxiv: type 1— fast, high capacity, parallel, nonconscious,
biased responses, contextualized, automatic, associative, experience-based decision making,
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independent of cognitive ability; type 2— slow, capacity limited, serial, conscious, normative
responses, abstract, controlled, rule-based, consequential decision making, correlated with
cognitive ability.
A defining characteristic of type 2 processes, that it relies on working memory, is
responsible, according to Evans (2010a), for other observed attributes. Working memory
includes the operations responsible for storing information that is accessible to the mind and
manipulating that information so that cognitive processes can occur. The fact that a process must
use working memory consequentially underlies why that process is slow, effortful, and
sequential. It has also been shown that working memory capacity, or how much information can
be held accessible to the mind, varies among individuals (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). This
difference in working memory can explain the difference in ability seen in type 2 processes but
not type 1. People tend to respond with the same amount of success when using type 1 cognitive
modes, however there can be variety with regards to accuracy when people apply type 2 modes
to cognitive tasks. Something to keep in mind, and question, is the variation in ability among
mindreaders; some people are very good while others are not, and I will explain how this
difference in ability is a result of varying working memory capacity, yet our default mechanism
is nevertheless a type 1 process.
Evans also proposes that type 2 processing provides humans with certain cognitive
abilities such as hypothetical thinking, mental simulation, and decision making (2010b). One
specific cognitive ability, cognitive decoupling, is another defining characteristic of type 2
processes and relies on working memory; it is the ability to separate one’s beliefs of the world
from imaginary situations or being able to suppose without believing. As we will discuss in
greater detail further down, simulation, which some authors argue is our default, primary,
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automatic mechanism for mental attribution, possesses many of the characteristics usually
ascribed to type 2 processes including using imagined situations. A potential problem for
proponents of a simulation-based hybrid account or pure ST arises if we consider simulation to
be a type 2 process, especially if we take ‘default’ to mean something like uses the least amount
of resources. While there are many variations of dual-process theories each with their own
definitions of two types, boundaries, and characteristics, type 2 processes tend to have a more
consistent definition across theories.
Descriptions of type 1 processes, on the other hand, differ more often among theories.
However, and most importantly, because a defining feature is that they are not dependent on
working memory, type 1 processes are usually characterized as automatic despite varying
accounts. The typical features of this group are correlated such that processes without a
dependence on working memory tend to be fast, associative, and unconscious; but the correlated
features are not defining of all type 1 processes. Since they do not rely on working memory,
another relatively agreed upon, consequential feature is that they do not require “controlled
attention” (Evans & Stanovich, 2013); so, while type 1 processing is mandatory and automatic
when the triggering stimuli are encountered, type 2 processes, in contrast, require some input
from high-level control systems (Stanovich, 2011). The automaticity and independence of
controlled attention and working memory may provide a case for type 1 processes being the
primary mode for tasks that can be completed via either process type.
The distinction between type 1 vs. type 2 processes can also be described as: unconscious
vs. conscious, unintentional vs. intentional, effortless vs. effortful, and uncontrollable vs.
controllable (Bargh, 1994). As previously stated and taken from the different distinctions just
listed, each type has a cluster of features that are correlated with one another, such that processes
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of a given type usually exhibit the cluster of features but only necessarily possess the defining
characteristics. Some aspects observable in type 2 processes like attention, working memory,
effort, and consciousness seem to have a connection, such that the requirement on working
memory explains why these slow, conscious processes are, most importantly, effortful. The link
among these features is still open to debate; but according to Baars (1997), working memory is
necessary for consciousness, so to be conscious of something requires that it is within working
memory, however not everything within working memory is conscious. For elements of the
working memory to be conscious, there must be attention on them, so it is possible to have
contents of working memory not attended to and so unconscious. Similarly, Cowan (1999)
argued that “working memory includes the focus of attention, which holds the information of
which the person is conscious […] However, working memory also includes activated memory
outside of attention or conscious awareness” (p. 68). So when a process includes working
memory it is necessarily effortful because it is utilizing limited resources; it is usually conscious
because attention is focused on the element in question, but does not have to be, as consciousness
is an additional but not defining feature of type 2 processes. What is important to take away is
the link between effort and working memory such that a process that depends on working
memory is effortful and characterized as type 2. Additionally, since we can define a process as
effortful when it requires working memory resources, the least effortful procedure would then be
the process that require the least amount of resources. And since type 1 does not rely on working
memory, while type 2 must, we can conclude that type 1 is less effortful.
It is also worth noting that for certain cognitive functions, the mind can use either type 1
or type 2 processes to accomplish the tasks. I am proposing that mindreading is such a task, in
which a person can use two types of theory, that being either traditional “folk-psychology” or her
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connectionist network theory to attribute high-level mental states to others. As hinted at up to
this point: folk-psychology exhibits type 2 features, and connectionist networks possess type 1
characteristics; therefore, I refer to the traditional, symbolic theory as tt2 and the associative,
connectionist-network theory as tt1. As just mentioned, a person can use either of these processes
to attribute mental states; however, it is less misleading to state that the tt2 can intervene with tt1
processing, such that using tt2 might provide a different attributed state than tt1. We should
prefer the latter description because the default procedure is tt1, but tt2 can also be activated to
reach an output and override that of tt1. For example, when asked about different heuristics that
humans employ, people give intuitive responses, which are characteristic of type 1 processing
but can sometimes provide inaccurate answersxv, however type 2 processing can intervene and
override the type 1 output. Usually, behavior is in line with our default processes, meaning
individuals rely on type 1 processing, but intervention can occur and type 2 outputs considered
when there is difficulty, novelty, and motivation. There are many motives that initiate type 2
processing, but the most prevalent is the desire for accuracy (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Without
motivation, people will use the type 1 mode, which we have identified as not relying on working
memory and so effortless. But in cases of intervention comes a need for working memory
resources (Evan & Stanovich, 2013). Requiring cognitive resources for working memory and
attention, type 2 processes will be affected by cognitive load and susceptible to distraction and
interference (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). These potential problems and limitations explain why
we must be motivated to initiate type 2 processes, that is, some input from high control systems.
It follows then, that in cases where either process can perform the task, our type 1 procedures,
which are effortless, automatic, and do not rely on working memory, will be the primary process
unless we are motivated to use and have the resources necessary for type 2 processes.
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Accounts of exactly how the two processes, or cognitive types, interact can vary among
the different dual-process theories. For example, Barbey and Sloman’s model (2007) proposes
both type 1 and type 2 processes run in parallel and resolve any conflict among the two if
necessary. However, there are problems with this “parallel-competitive” view such as the waste
of limited resources that are required for type 2 processes; those resources should be reserved for
the most important tasks and not allocated when it is unnecessary, that is when the task can be
completed using only type 1 processing. Another problem is the mismatch of time for each
process. Since type 1 processes are fast and automatic type 1 would have to wait for type 2 in
order to alleviate any conflict among them. (Evans & Stanovich, 2013).
Default Interventionism. A different theory of interaction and activation, default
interventionism, is laid out by Evans and Stonavich (2013), in line with Kahneman & Frederick
(2002), and the one I favor. The main aspect of this kind of model states that reflective logic, or
reason, (type 2) can intervene and override default, intuitive responses (type 1). In a defaultinterventionist model, type 1 processes are assumed to reach default, automatic responses
quicker than the reflective type 2 processes, but these later outputs are capable of intervening
with the fast, generated ones. Type 1 processes are automatically engaged and proceed when a
stimulus is encountered: however, type 2 processes, because they require limited resources, are
only engaged when motivated and if the mind has enough supplies. The type 2 process uses
precious resources to reach a decision but also must override the intuitive response and replace
that response with the one generated by the type 2 procedure. Evan and Stanovich (2013) posit
that our intuitive answers require little effort when used in novel situations, however error may
occur when people lack the relevant experience. Individuals rely on type 1, even in novel
situations; but error occurs because humans are cognitive misers, and thus sometimes use the
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easy-to-evaluate judgment in place of a harder one even if it is less accurate. Within cognition,
cognitive miser theory assumes that humans aim to conserve mental resources and so make
certain attributions about the world that they are familiar with or have a bias towards. Possibly
adding to the likelihood of this type of error is another factor that affects overriding intuitive
responses, namely, confidence in intuitive responses. When individuals feel confident in intuitive
responses, or have a meta-cognitive feeling of rightness, they are less likely to reflect on or
change their answer (Thompson, Turner, & Pennycock, 2011); this rightness translates into a
lack of motivation to activate the reflective type 2 mode. While accuracy is a strong motivator
for activating type 2 to intervene intuitive responses in novel cases, people have a tendency to
conserve resources, especially if they feel confident.
Unless there is motivation, difficulty, and novelty, a person will use type 1 processes.
Type 2 processes require precious, limited working memory resources and so are only allocated
when needed or motivated; therefore, people will rely on type 1 as our default cognitive mode in
certain tasks since it is automatic, effortless, and does not require working memory. This
preference holds true for the mindreading capacity. If in fact we do possess two different theory
modes, tt1 and tt2, then tt1 will be our default procedure because it requires the least amount of
resources, thus it is least effortful. And we have good reason to believe that people will conserve
resources when possible, on account of the cognitive miser theory. Another reason to assert that
connectionist networks, tt1, is primary comes from the definitive feature of automaticity of type
1 processes. Being a type 1 process, the connectionist network theory, tt1, is modular, fast, and
unconscious, but it is also automatically engaged when in the presence of a stimulus. Thus, it is
more probable that this automatic process is the one that individuals use in most cases since it is
accessible in every case. Again, even though it is activated by a stimulus, it is not low-level
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mindreading because it concerns peoples’ desires, beliefs, etc. Because it is least effortful, tt1 is
capable of activation in every situation, unlike tt2, which requires resources and motivation to
proceed. Therefore, if theory is dissected in this proposed way, then tt1 is the default, relied upon
in most cases, mechanism for mindreading because it requires the least amount of resources, or is
effortless, and automatically proceeds when stimuli are present.
As previously stated, knowledge in tt1 exists as the strengths between nodes, but
knowledge in tt2 is sentence-like information regarding the minds of others. While some
connectionists claim that the existence of a system like tt1 eliminates the need for a folkpsychology like tt2, I am arguing that tt2 is necessary to help guide, increase, and correct our tt1
process. In order to alter tt1, tt2 must be accessible to consciousness and tt1 must be susceptible
to supervised learning, more details to follow. For the most part, we attribute mental states to
others through our tt1 unless motivated to access our tt2 knowledge. Because we rely on this
intuitive response and because humans are cognitive misers, we sometimes are led astray as
when we attribute things we are more familiar with instead of using limited resources. The
salient features of the input might share similarities with some other input we have a great deal
of experience with, and so we wrongly attribute the previously experienced output to the new
input.
Understanding theory in this way, tt1 and tt2, provides this account with many upshots.
The neural network of tt1 explains theory as modular and nonconceptual, such that individuals
are capable of mindreading through this automatic mechanism without having to learn the
concepts that are required by a traditional folk-psychology account of mindreading. At the same
time, the tt2 aspect of this account explains how learning conceptual information regarding other
minds can affect mindreading via motivation to access that information at the time of attribution
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or through altering the tt1 connection weights through supervised learning. We also have a
picture of which theory will be initiated in different situations. By appealing to the cognitive
miser concept of psychology, we have an idea of what cognitive processes an individual will
generally utilize, that is, the ones that require the least amount of cognitive resources. Type 1
processes are automatic and effortless, so the default mechanism will be a type 1 process. An
individual will use tt1 to mindread unless the situation is difficult and novel and if the individual
is motivated to use the additional resources required by tt2.
Simulation
Simulation is another proposed mechanism individuals use to attribute mental states to
others. Traditional ST denies that we must use internally represented knowledge to accurately
describe and predict other people’s behavior. Instead, we utilize mental simulation with our own
mental faculties as the model of the person to whom we are attempting to attribute mental states.
One often-stated critique of traditional TT is its dependence on an elaborative folk-psychology.
An implication that follows if people do invoke simulation rather than rely on some base of
theories, is that the dominant explanation of cognitive capacities, internally represented
knowledge, would be wrong in at least one aspect of cognition but perhaps others (Stich &
Nichols, 1992). If ST is correct, then perhaps there is no knowledge structure of folk-psychology
at all. Instead of relying upon theories regarding other minds, ST suggests that people use their
own minds as a prototype and run a simulation to conclude and project a mental state to the
target. An individual utilizes her own modules to attribute mental states that she herself would
have if she simulated that situation with accurate inputs (further details concerning the
mechanism are to follow.)
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To some, simulation appears favorable over theory because it is not dependent on vast
knowledge regarding a conceptual tacit theory of folk-psychology. It does not rely on rich
information; in its place, the modules of the individual are taken “offline,” so to speak, and fed
pretend inputs to generate a pretend decision. For instance, to attribute a decision of future
behavior of a target, one would use her own decision making module; but instead of her genuine
beliefs and desires, the attributor would feed pretend desires of the target and let the module
proceed to produce a pretend decision, which is then tagged and becomes a genuine belief about
what the target is likely to decide (she believes that the target will do X, since she would do X if
she was in that situation with the target’s beliefs and desires). According to simulationists,
mindreaders simulate the target’s state with little or no conscious awareness. This type of
mechanism is believed to produce accurate attributions since humans have the same fundamental
processing features. If the mindreader puts herself in the same “starting state” and her cognitive
processes execute, then there should be mental mimicry, such that her output will be the same as
the target’s and allow her to know what the target will do (Goldman & Jordan, 2013).
E-Imagination. In order to construct the starting states, or pretend states, a subject
utilizes “E-imagination.” Enactment imagination (E-imagination) is a psychological construct of
mental pretense, the content of which can be “conscious or covert, voluntary or automatic”
(Goldman, 2006, p. 151). The pretend states from E-imagination can be created voluntarily or
automatically and can be, but do not have to be, conscious. In some cases, a subject may engage
consciously to recreate a perceptual experience through E-imagination, like trying to remember
where her dresser is in relation to her bed. This recreated state would be conscious and voluntary.
Another description of E-imagination given by Goldman and Jordan (2013) is the faculty that
constructs a state like the specific state one wishes to be in. If a person wishes to be in mental
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state M, she can imagine being in an M-like state, which is functionally very similar to M, and
when either are fed into cognitive mechanisms similar outputs are computed. In the case of
predicting what a person will decide to do, the attributor imagines similar beliefs and desires of
the target to be fed into her own decision making module. Since her decision-making module is
similar to the target’s, the attributor’s module should produce a similar or identical output. The
offline, pretend output is then sent to the attributor’s prediction module resulting in a prediction
of what the target will do. Again, this process occurs without relying on information or theories
about how other minds operate (e.g. make decisions); the attributor comes to an attributable state
through simulating what she would do (what decision she would make) if she held starting states
(e.g. beliefs and desires) similar to the target.
Let’s revisit the example of Donna and the donuts, but this time proceed according to
ST. Donna desires donuts and believes that DonutDisturb has the best donuts; so, which shop
will she go to? In order to compute what Donna will decide, we need to imagine what we would
do by simulating her mental state. An individual would need to create pretend states (from Eimagination) that match the states of the target, and then she would feed these pretend states into
her own decision-making module, which is being run offline, to generate a decision. In the
simulation mechanism, the inputs are the pretend states and the output is the state which will be
projected and attributed to the target. For Donna’s case, the mindreader would construct a
pretend desire for donuts and a pretend belief that DonutDisturb is the best donut place; the
generated decision to go to DonutDisturb is still a pretend output. Since the modules during
simulation are taken offline, the outputs are still not genuine (meaning not belonging to the
mindreader)xvi; however, at this point the simulation process ends and the output is then
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attributed to the target and becomes a genuine metarepresentational belief of the mindreader (i.e.
the belief that “Donna will go to DonutDisturb”). See Figure 2.
Simulationists claim that ST is simpler than TT, however that is not completely obvious
when we identify the two components necessary for mindreading: the database of how people
behave and the mechanism which extracts that information (Stich & Nichols, 1992). Earlier in
the discussion about traditional TT, I mentioned that inference mechanisms are used to extract
information from other folk-theories, like folk-physics, so we can use this same tool for our folkpsychology; however, TT relies on a database of encoded information of how other minds work.
So, while the mechanism for TT is already given, the database is notxvii. ST, on the other hand,
has the database “for free” since it uses the attributor’s own mind as the model; but the
mechanism of extracting the relevant information is not as freely given as that of TT. For ST, the
module must be taken offline, pretend states are generated and fed into that module, and the
outputs have to be transformed from pretend outputs into metarepresentational beliefs
concerning the target (that is the attributor believes that the target believes X, or will do Y)xviii.
Although simulation does not rely on some vast information or folk-psychology, it does
involve certain key skills in order to operate. Imagination, or as Goldman (2006) called it “Eimagination,” self-reflection, inhibition, and characterization of the output are all distinct features
and necessary elements of simulation. Goldman (2006) proposed that self-reflection, or
introspection, is the tool within the mindreading phenomenon that not only initiates simulation,
but also is necessary to inhibit one’s genuine states and to characterize and attribute the
generated outputs from simulation. Mitchell, Banaji, and Macrae (2005) demonstrate that selfreflection is a natural subactivity of third person mindreading by citing studies, in which the
medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) was activated during tasks requiring introspection and also
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when completing a study concerning third-person attributions; the results of which were
consistent with earlier findings that the MPFC is activated during third-person mindreading.
Therefore, people do engage in self-reflection during many higher-level mindreading tasks.
Goldman states that self-reflection is not as explicitly or obviously part of TT, and so the
empirical evidence of activated or engaged self-reflection is reason to support a ST-based
account (2006)xix.
To engage simulation, an individual has to judge herself as similar to the target; and this
occurs through self-reflection. If she does not consider the target to be like her, then she will not
attempt to simulate that mental state because being so dissimilar might mean that she would not
be able to reach an analogous pretend output. The judgement regarding similarity is not always
conscious, but it is necessary to start the simulative mechanism. Perhaps the failure to simulate
based on judged dissimilarity is evidence that simulation requires effort, such that individuals
only simulate when they believe it can provide accurate attributions (they simulate to explain the
behavior of a person of the same race but not a member of some outgroup, despite the behavior,
or input, being the same for both individuals).
Inhibition. In order to simulate someone else’s mental state, a person must inhibit her
own genuine beliefs etc. and not include them in the simulation. Therefore, reliable simulation
involves a person monitoring her own genuine states and inhibiting or quarantining them. Selfreflection is the tool used to identify and quarantine one’s genuine states, so that they do not
contaminate the simulated output. Without this step, quarantine failure can occur, such that the
simulated output would not reflect the belief of the target because the subject’s genuine states
(beliefs, feelings, etc.) are affecting the simulation. The interference of genuine states can lead to
error unless the mindreader’s own mental states are inhibited. Inhibition in this context is closer
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in line with self-control, rather than inhibition in the neural sense. In the neural sense, the
activation of a neuron is inhibited; but in mindreading, inhibition refers to genuine states to be
tagged, separated from pretend states, and disregarded during the simulation via introspection.
Inhibition, or quarantine, is extremely important as a mindreader will always have her own
desires, beliefs, and intentions alongside the pretend ones; her genuine states must be segregated
from the pretend ones, an activity that may not be trivial in producing an accurate attribution
(Goldman & Jordan, 2013). The dependence on inhibition in mindreading and the difficulty
associated with it leads some, like Goldman and Jordan (2013), to believe that simulation is the
best explanation for egocentric bias, which is a common error in mindreading. The phenomenon
of egocentric bias occurs when a person incorrectly attributes her own mental states to others.
This phenomenon is potentially problematic for a TT model because it seems to suggest that
attributing mental states to others relies on access to one’s own or at least incorporates it, which
is not consistent with traditional TT (Nichols, forthcoming). Because this type of bias is so
prevalent in mindreading and can be explained by appealing to our genuine states that are not
quarantined in simulation, some take the phenomenon of egocentric bias as evidence for
simulation as the default mechanism in attributing mental states to others. This phenomenon will
be addressed and explained via the Dual Type Theory Account later.
How do we go about inhibiting these genuine mental states? Do we really rely on a
process that is so difficult, such that mindreaders often fail to inhibit their own states and
incorrectly attribute contaminated outputs? Proponents of simulation argue that egocentric bias is
evidence for simulation being our default mechanism; however, appealing to the difficulty of the
process seems inconsistent with arguing that it is defaultxx. If quarantining genuine states in
mindreading involves stopping those states from being fed into the offline module, then that type
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of control probably requires the same amount of effort as stopping certain inputs from feeding
into modules when not offline. For example, when deciding how to respond to someone who has
treated her wrongly, but wanting to remain in control and not react out of extreme anger or
frustration, does a person inhibit the output of that module given the input of extreme anger or
does she stop the extreme anger from being fed into that module? It is not obvious, but I think
the latter approach is more realistic with respect to efficiency of being able to control one’s
behavior and emotion regulation. It is easier to stop the consequent behavior that an emotion
might elicit when that emotion arises, not after it has been processed and a resulting behavior has
been decided.
If emotion regulation, or other instances of self-moderation or self-control, rely on the
same type of inhibition that simulation postulatesxxi, then we can look at instances of the former
and its relationship with cognitive resources to provide insight into whether a mechanism that
incorporates this type of inhibition is going to be default. A more in-depth discussion about
egocentric bias, defaultness, and the implications on mindreading mechanisms is to come when
we discuss hybrid accounts; however, I would like to quickly mention some empirical studies
that have documented cognitive resources affecting one’s ability to self-moderate concerning
emotion regulation. If emotion regulation requires cognitive resources, and if emotion regulation
involves the same type of inhibition as simulation, then simulation is also taxing on cognitive
resources.
Grillon, Quispe-Escudero, Mathur, and Ernst (2015) tested whether individuals depleted
of cognitive resources would be worse at regulating their emotional responses. They found that
the group of participants who performed a difficult task were not able to decrease their emotional
response like the participants who did not complete a hard task, despite both groups having
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similar startle responses. Both groups experienced emotion reactivity, however the group that
was mentally fatigued, and therefore depleted of cognitive resources, was not able to
downregulate that emotional response. One possible explanation is that they were unable to
inhibit this emotion from being an input within certain modules because the resources needed for
inhibition were depleted.
Johns, Inzlicht, and Shmader (2008) propose the difficulty associated with emotional
regulation as the explanation for stereotype threat. When aware of a certain stereotype, those that
fall into that category often perform according to the stereotype, which is negative. The process
responsible for decreased performance as seen in stereotype threat instances can be explained by
a subject’s attempt to control her emotions. The regulation of emotions depletes cognitive
resources, resulting in worse performance. However, if participants are given coping
mechanisms to control emotion, they do better on the tasks.
In another study, participants specifically instructed to regulate emotion (hide frustration)
performed worse; the increase in errors suggests that emotion regulation depletes attentional
resources as well (Goldber & Grandey, 2007). Testing the other direction of this relationship,
Schweizer, Grahn, Hampshire, Mobbs, and Dalgleish (2013) show that easy working memory
training can lead to improvements in emotion regulation, such that participants who received the
training reported being better at reducing negative emotional responses. This result comes from
training working memory and increasing the ability to perform exhausting or difficult tasks over
time. The better the individuals are at using working memory resources effectively, the better
they are at emotion regulation.
Characterization. While simulationists attack TT for being complex, simulation is not as
simple as it seems. Not only does inhibition, which is necessary for the mechanism to
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appropriately mimic the mind state of another, deplete cognitive abilities, another potential
problem that arises concerns characterizing the output of the simulation from a pretend belief to
a metabelief attributable to the target. In simulation, the offline module provides a pretend output
that the subject must attribute to the target by tagging it as a metarepresentational belief (a belief
about what the target believes). How does this occur? Goldman discusses how an individual can
go from a pretend state x to a genuine belief that T believes x, a metarepresentation that
incorporates attitude type and content, via self-reflection. He suggests that self-reflection, or
introspection, is capable of classifying the pretend, simulated output by tagging it as an attitude
of the target with certain content. And as previously stated, self-reflection is necessary in ST and
proven to play a role in mindreading tasks; it is less obviously included in TT. Therefore,
Goldman takes the role of self-reflection in this instance as more evidence for a simulation-based
hybrid account. The empirical evidence of self-reflection in mindreading tasks is explained by
the role it plays in simulation to inhibit genuine states and to tag outputs. However, I argue that
there is also a role of self-reflection in theory-based mindreading. I will provide an alternative
explanation to address this concernxxii.
If mindreading occurs via simulation, then the accuracy of the attribution relies on the
starting states, or inputs, of the simulation. Given that humans have the same processing, if we
use our own modules as a prototype and supply starting states believed to be similar to, or the
same as, the target, then the module will produce an output that is similar to, or the same as, that
of the target. Our similar psychology ensures accurate attribution by mimicking the mental state.
However, if the mindreader does not imagine the appropriate starting state or does not possess
the right information, then the output will most likely be incorrect (Goldman & Jordan, 2013). If
a module is fed incorrect inputs, then the output will not be like the target’s. In general, E-
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imagination accuracy depends on relevant knowledge, such as memory, to create accurate inputs
for simulation. For example, trying to simulate an image of the Titanic without having seen it or
having detailed descriptions would generate a less reliable, or accurate, visual imagery than a
simulation that accesses past experiences of seeing pictures or having seen the ship in real life. In
the traditional ST-TT debate, the question arose whether visual imagery, like that of the Titanic,
which relies on information, is simulation or theory since the “generation involves recourse to
information stored in memory” (Goldman, 2006, p. 150). However, according to Goldman,
reliance on information in memory does not make a process non-simulative, as long as the state
is produced top-down for the purpose of replicating a naturally produced state (the imagined
visual image of the Titanic replicates the state of seeing the Titanic).
In addition to lack of relevant knowledge limiting the construction of the pretend state,
another problem is the necessity to inhibit genuine states, as states earlier. The genuine states
must be separated and inhibited, otherwise the computed output will be contaminated and the
simulation not accurate. To avoid this interference, the genuine states are “quarantined” so that
they do not penetrate the imagined or simulated tracking process (Goldman & Jordan, 2013). It is
effortful, as seen in comparable instances of inhibition like emotion regulation. So, if humans use
simulation, and therefore inhibition, to attribute high-level mental states to others, then we are
using a model that depletes cognitive resources. Conversely, if a person is depleted of cognitive
resources, she will be less accurate since she does not have the means needed to quarantine her
own states.
But can simulation really be our default mindreading mechanism with so much reliance
on limited cognitive resources? As I have identified ‘default,’ and when considering the DualType Theory and default-interventionism, there is reason to believe that type 1 processes will be
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default mechanisms for a given task, but type 2 theory can override or intervene when the
situation is novel, difficult, or when there is motivation (like the greatest motive: a desire for
accuracy). Without motivation, people will use the most effortless mode available. Such a
process would be one that possesses type 1 features: intuitive, automatic, and does not require
working memory; thus, if a system or process does require working memory, then it is not type
1, but type 2. Simulation might be a type 2 process, since it is affected by cognitive load or
resource depletion, and it possesses other defining features of type 2 mechanisms: reflective,
requires working memory, and involves cognitive decoupling (Evans & Stanovich, 2013).
According to Evans, (2010b), type 2 processing is also responsible for some cognitive functions
like hypothetical thinking, mental simulation, and cognitive decoupling. Cognitive decoupling is
the ability to separate supposition and belief, such that a person can imagine situations without
believing them. Simulation in high-level mindreading, the process of imagining certain states to
create pretend states that can be fed into one’s offline modules in order to determine and attribute
high-level mental states to others, seems to include cognitive decoupling. It also relies on
working memory and cognitive resources, since it can be affected by cognitive depletion. If
simulation is a type 2 process, then maybe this is more evidence that it is not our default
mindreading mechanism, especially if we can provide an alternative method that is reliable but
not as effortful. Simulation is fast and unconscious, so perhaps it does not fit into type 1 or type 2
but is a hybrid of some kind; and while tt2 is not fast and unconscious, like simulation, tt1 is less
effortful. Because authors have not divided theory in this way, this type of reasoning was not
available in previous discussions about primacy.
In the traditional ST- TT debate, the theory in question was sentence-like, rule-based,
internally represented knowledge regarding the minds of others; and it is also effortful since it is
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deliberate and requires accessing that information in memory systems (Smith & DeCoster,
2000). However, by including a connectionist network (tt1) in addition to the traditional idea of
theory (tt2), we have an alternative method of attributing mental states to others that does not
rely on an internal database of sentence-like folk-psychology, is less effortful because it does not
use limited working memory resources, and can also explain some of the empirical evidence of
mindreading. By appealing to connectionist networks, tt1, we still have knowledge representing
the world, but it is not like that of tt2. Instead, tt1 is synchronically state-nonconceptual and the
strengths among the nodes reflect the statistical probabilities of regularities within the
environment. While I will argue that our conceptual tt2 knowledge can train or adjust the
connection strengths in our tt1 to reflect the knowledge found in tt2, making that network
diachronically conceptual, the synchronically nonconceptuality of tt1 provides the networks with
automaticity and effortlessness. Therefore, in cases where it can provide accurate associations of
the environment, tt1 will be the default mechanismxxiii.
Explanations of a Hybrid
Traditionally authors argued for one mindreading method exclusively over another, that
is that an individual performs all mindreading only through theory or only through simulation.
However, mindreading is a complex construct that utilizes different approaches depending on the
type of mindreading task at hand, motivation, and cognitive resources available; therefore, there
has been increasing support for a hybrid account that includes both theory and simulation.
Within these hybrid accounts, one mechanism is still given primacy over the other, or considered
our default process behind attributing mental states to others.
The variety of mindreading tasks leads authors to propose hybrid accounts like that of
Stich and Nichols, who favor theory over simulation, and Goldman, who holds a simulation-
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based account. I will not focus on defending the existence of a mindreading capacity that
incorporates both approaches, but I will quickly mention some instances that establish both
mechanisms are used in mindreading. Stich and Nichols (2003) provide cases for both simulation
and theory mindreading to argue for a hybrid account, since the examples include obvious
instances of one process being able to provide a conclusion when the other cannot.
A case of mindreading which is most easily understood by appealing to simulation is
inference prediction; people are capable of predicting inferences of targets, even when they are
nondemonstrative (Stich & Nichols, 2003). TT advocates have not tried to explain this
phenomenon while simulation provides a simple account that addresses the accuracy of inference
prediction. A way that TT could try to explain this is to suggest we have a theory about how
others will make inferences. However, it is simpler to suggest that we rely on what our own
inference would be and attribute that to the target. Not only is it simpler to appeal to simulation,
it also explains the accuracy of this skill which encompasses instances that we have no
experience with. Individuals can accurately predict inferences even in cases which are different
from things they have likely encountered; so, it is more probable to propose that we rely on what
our own inferences would be (simulation) and attribute those to others than to suggest we have
somehow acquired information, or a theory, about how people will reason (which is farfetched
when considering that we are good at predicting inferences even when we do not have
experience). The accuracy aspect of this phenomenon is reason to believe that we are using our
own inference mechanism to simulate what our inference would be.
Desire attribution, on the other hand, cannot be explained by appealing to simulation and
instead demonstrates an instance of mindreading that must be subserved by theory (Stich &
Nichols, 2003). When an individual attributes the desire that caused the target to behave in such

38
a way, she uses theory. Goldman (2006) agrees that in this kind of retrodictive mindreading, it
would be impossible to use simulation alone because modules are unidirectional, and therefore
cannot take the outputs and simulate what belief or desire brought about the behavior or belief in
question. He proposes it is more likely that individuals theorize and conclude certain inputs to
then test in a simulation, similar to hypotheses testing. In order to explain the behavior she just
observed, an individual will rely on theories to gain insight into potential reasons why a person
said or did a specific thing. She then uses the insight from the theories as inputs for a simulation
and compares the simulated output with the observed behavior. However, a problem with this
analysis-by-synthesis account is that it generates too many candidates to be tested. The
underdetermination that arises with the simulations from theorized inputs, in addition to the
systematic inaccuracy of desire attribution, suggests that it is not simulation which leads to the
attribution (Stich & Nichols, 2003). Desire attribution may just be reliant on theory and not the
subsequent testing via simulation. Regardless, desire attribution is evidence of mindreading via
theory.
Mindreading incorporates both methods, but again, the principle concern of this
discussion is which mechanism is our default. By saying one process is default usually means it
is the automatic, standard, or “most basic and spontaneous method” (Goldman & Shanton,
forthcoming). Goldman mentions some potentially phylogeneticxxiv and ontologicalxxv reasons,
but ultimately his empirical reasoning (such as egocentric bias) supports the claim that we will
use simulation as the default mechanism in a hybrid account. I disagree and propose theory is our
default, so I will focus on his empirical reasoning and provide alternative interpretations that
attempt to explain certain phenomena through a Dual Type Theory Account. I think appealing to
the least effortful mechanism is a better determining factor of the default process. As explained
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through the psychological aspect of cognitive misers, without motivation people will use the
most effortless mode available; and this phenomenon is evident in other aspects of cognition.
Certain psychological tendencies, like the ‘representative heuristic,’ demonstrate that
individuals respond intuitively because it requires the least amount of effort (Goldstein &
Gigerenzer, 2002; Hilbig & Pohl, 2008). The representative heuristic states that a person relies
on past experiences to guide decision making, so when a person is choosing between two
objects, and she has experience with one over the other, she will choose the one she recognizes.
This is different than the “mere exposure effect,” which suggests that people prefer things, with
which they are familiar. The representative heuristic is more of a shortcut for individuals to use
representation they have experience with to guide behavior or decisions in novel situations. We
can apply the same logic of the representative heuristic to other mental processes like
mindreading. When confronted with situations we are familiar with or have similarities to past
experiences, the cognitive system will come to a decision based on convenience and speed, thus
using the least amount of cognitive resources. With the descriptions of type 1/type 2 processing,
individuals will choose type 1 processes, which are automatic and do not rely on working
memory resources. The bat and ball problemxxvi is another example of reliance on type 1
processes, according to Kahneman (2011), when people place too much faith in intuitive
responses because of their aversion to using cognitive effort.
While I will make an argument for a theory-based account of mindreading that appeals to
the amount of effort of each method as evidence for tt1 being default, first I will present some of
Goldman’s empirical reasons for the primacy of simulation. To support his claims, he references
the pattern of error known as egocentric bias as evidence that simulation is primary since this
phenomenon can be explained through quarantine failure during simulation. He also cites studies
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regarding self-reflection used during third-person mindreading tasks in support for simulationbased mindreading. Self-reflection is known to be used in the simulation process, but it is not
obviously included in a theory account (Goldman, 2006). However, we can consider
interpretations that explain these phenomena as compatible with a Dual Type Theory Account.
Egocentric Bias
The seemingly most convincing empirical evidence for simulationists and problematic for
theory theorists is egocentric bias, which is explainable through simulation, but not as obviously
through theory. Egocentric bias, a common bias in mindreading, occurs when a person attributes
her own mental states to others. It appears to suggest that we rely on access to our own states
when attributing mental states to others, in which case mindreading would be based on
simulation rather than some tacit theory (Goldman & Shanton, forthcoming). Because egocentric
bias is so prevalent in instances of mindreading, if it does imply simulation, then this is reason to
believe that simulation is the default mechanism in a hybrid account of mindreading. Therefore,
an account based on theory must address this phenomenon.
According to simulation-based accounts of mindreading, egocentric bias is explained
through quarantine-failure, or the failure of inhibiting one’s own genuine states when simulating
the mental states of others through imagination. ST proposes that in order to mindread higherlevel states of a target, the mindreader uses her own modules as the prototype of the target’s
mind and feeds pretend states, that resemble states of the target, into her offline modules to reach
a pretend output, which is then characterized as a metarepresentational state attributed to the
target. The accuracy of the output depends on the resemblance of the starting states, which the
mindreader creates through E-imagination, to the actual starting states of the target. Since
humans share similar mental processing, the attribution should be accurate if the inputs are
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similar to the target’s starting inputs. However, another aspect affects the correctness of the
simulation process. As discussed earlier in the simulation section, a mindreader must separate
her own genuine states from the pretend ones fed into her offline module. Although she creates
pretend beliefs that reflect what the target beliefs, she still possesses her own beliefs, desires, etc.
If her own states are included in the simulation, then the output will not reflect the target, who
may not share those beliefs, which are genuine to the mindreader since the inputs would differ
between the subject and target. Therefore, inhibition, or quarantine, becomes extremely
important for accurate attribution by excluding genuine beliefs from the simulation.
If ST is correct, and we construct pretend states to be fed into our offline modules, then
the pretend states will contain similar elements to our genuine states; and this similarity will
make confusing them likely to occur (Goldman & Shanton, forthcoming). If our modules confuse
these two bodies of states, then our genuine states could replace the pretend ones in the
simulation process; in which case, it would produce an egocentric output. Therefore, an
individual must inhibit genuine states, that is separate and tag them to be excluded from the
simulation. As discussed earlier, inhibition is difficult and requires cognitive resources; thus, the
difficulty would explain the pervasive failure and consequent egocentric bias. As seen in
instances of self-regulation and emotion-regulation, which also incorporate inhibition, the ability
to inhibit is affected by the cognitive resources available (see discussion on simulation stated
earlier). Since it is affected by cognitive depletion, inhibition is effortful; and so, simulation (or
accurate simulation) is also effortful. While the difficulty to inhibit is one approach to explain
egocentric bias, we may also appeal to theory to understand the common error without the
demand on cognitive resources.
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However, Goldman & Jordan (2013) claim that TT does not readily explain this
phenomenon, since states associated with it are not as easily confused with one’s genuine states,
whereas the pretend states of ST closely resemble the same type of states as a mindreader’s
genuine ones. Throughout mindreading literature there are many types of egocentric biases, like
false-belief attribution, in which individuals allow their own knowledge to affect the attributions
to their targets. With a hybrid account of mindreading, I propose that some instances of
egocentric bias are a result of simulation and the difficulty of inhibition that is associated with it.
Some instances of mindreading are a result of simulation, yet theory is our default mechanism.
While some egocentric attributions are from a failure to inhibit genuine beliefs during
simulation, other egocentric outputs could be the result of our theories used in mindreading.
Therefore, egocentric bias is compatible with a theory-based account. I think that we can develop
egocentric theories, that, when incorporated into our tt1, ultimately affect how we attribute
mental states to others. We can offer an explanation via theory, specifically the Dual Type
Theory Account, to explain many instances of this pervasive egocentric error in order to hold tt1
as the default mechanism of mindreading.
An account arguing that tt1, or the connectionist network theory, is the default
mindreading process, must account for egocentric error and offer an interpretation of the
phenomenon while appealing to the encoded theory in tt1. As Nichols (forthcoming) stated, there
is reason to consider egocentric attribution as the default response that people use unless there is
overriding information that provides more clarification; additionally, this bias increases if people
are under time pressure (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004). If our intuitive response
is egocentric, then we seem to be using our own minds to understand the minds of others; so, our
knowledge of other minds depends on our own experiences (Nichols, forthcoming). But can we
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explain this egocentric knowledge in terms of a Dual Type Theory Account? If our intuitive
responses are a result of tt1, then tt1 must be egocentric. The egocentric theory encoded in tt1
could be reflecting an egocentric tt2, if our two systems interact in that way, such that tt2 can
train tt1. What I am suggesting is that our knowledge regarding other minds depends on our own
mind and experiences, which then are generalized and added into our folk-psychology. We use
our own case to make inferences about all other minds. If we do generalize our experiences in
this way, then our folk-psychology theory will be inherently egocentrically biased. Although this
seems problematic to make generalizations of folk-psychology based on one case, the egocentric
strategy is highly reliable (Nichols, forthcoming). Especially if human psychology is similar, a
folk-psychology incorporating generalizations of our own mental processes will be highly
accurate in understanding other minds. However, we need an account of an egocentric tt1, not
just folk-psychology (tt2).
Acquisition
To discuss egocentric tendencies on the Dual Type Theory Account, we need to first
understand acquisition in both theories and the connection among them. As mentioned before, tt1
is the connectionist network representing knowledge regarding other minds via the strengths of
connections among the nodes within the network. I am proposing that connectionist networks
can learn in a bottom-up way, but also in a theoretically-driven way. These networks are
synchronically state-nonconceptual, and therefore do not necessarily depend on concepts; in
which case, they reflect the statistical probabilities and regularities experienced in one’s
environment. However, they are susceptible to supervised learning and so can alter the weights
within the system with influence from tt2, conceptual knowledge of folk-psychology. A more in
depth discussion of this process is to follow. Although this process is slow and effortful since it
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requires consciousness, it is possible for type 2 systems to train type 1 via consolidation, which
includes repeated presentations from the type 2 to type 1 processes (McClelland, McNaughton,
& O'Reilly, 1995).
Tt1, being modular, implies the innate capacity that humans have to mindread, however
the reliability of those connectionist networks depends on the adjustment of the weights among
nodes in response to cues in the environment and successful responses to that environment. If
new situations are encountered, ones that include stimuli that are not inputs in a current
connectionist network, then the connectionist network will not be reliable. So this explains why
children’s theory of mind is not well developed, because they lack the experience with other
minds to have a reliable tt1. Instead, a child uses similar inputs that sometimes produce
inaccurate outputs. However, as the child learns new concepts and increases her tt2, she can use
this information to train up her tt1 to respond appropriately. This requires allocating attention
and effort, which increases in ease as a child becomes older. Tt1 is responsive to environmental
cues but also to tt2; so, inaccurate attributions could be the result of relying on similar, but
incorrect, inputs of a network, or they could be stem from using a network that is guided by an
inaccurate tt2. As our tt2 knowledge increases and our allocation of attention improves, we can
train our tt1 to reflect accurate knowledge regarding other minds.
In regards to egocentric bias, this is not the hard-hitting case for a simulation based
hybrid account that Goldman thinks it is. Our default tt1 can be egocentric if it is trained by
supervised learning via tt2, which exhibits egocentric theories. But how does our tt2 gain the
knowledge it has about the psychological processes of other minds? Folk-psychology, is the
information regarding the minds of others, not our own psychological occurrences; however, we
use our own psychological patterns and our own experiences to generalize about the habits and
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thoughts of other people, or at least this is where our folk-psychology theory of mind begins. Is
there a mechanism available to us that is capable of such a task? As seen in Goldman’s account
of projection from the simulation mechanism, introspection tags our outputs as a
metarepresentational belief to be attributed to the subject in question. It is just as probable, then,
that outputs can also increase our tt2 in the same way, that is the output is characterized and sent
to some other module, like an inference module, to make inferences about other minds. In the
case of simulation, our belief generation module and others run offline; but if introspection is
capable of tagging these offline conclusions, it can also tag the ones that truly belong to us—our
genuine feelings, reasons, and experiences. If self-reflection can tag outputs to be classified in a
different way, then we could use our own experiences to generalize about the minds of others.
Those experiences, the outputs of our modules, become included in our folk-psychology. In this
case, if our theory of other minds can come from the generalization of our own experiences, then
this knowledge will automatically possess an egocentric foundation. Therefore, a tt1 that is
trained by such a tt2 will also reflect an egocentric bias.
Now there are cases in which we do not have experiences with that given situation and do
not have the tt1 to reliably attribute mental states to others. In this case, we are motivated to use
additional resources for a more accurate attribution. We can run a simulation to determine how
we would feel and then attribute that state to the person in question. But once that experience and
tagging is successful, that information is now added to tt2 and up for availability to train our tt1.
The outputs of simulation count as experiences to be generalized and added to the tt2. Once they
are included in tt2, that knowledge can train out tt1 through supervised learning. I am suggesting,
though, that our primary mechanism is tt1, but if we do not possess the correct network for a
given circumstance we can resort to simulation to gain that information. As a child’s theory of

46
mind is developing, she does not have reliable networks nor a vast conceptual knowledge
regarding other minds, instead she relies on the generalizations from her own experiences, or in
cases where she does not have experience, she will simulate, come to some conclusion about
how she would feel, generalize that output to other minds, and add that knowledge into her tt2.
The innateness of tt1 might explain how humans have one folk-psychology for everyone. As a
child increases her knowledge of other minds and learns new concepts, she can begin to expand
her tt2, which can then influence her tt1. This Dual Type Theory also explains how we can have
intuitive egocentric responses (tt1), but more information can alter the output (tt2 intervenes).
Much like that of folk-grammar, our learned conceptual knowledge can help aid our executing
the task at hand, but the default procedure, the connectionist network, is still responsive to
stimuli and experiences (such as hearing certain grammar and learning from that, without having
accessible theory). This tt1 is modular in that it is innately predisposed, but our conceptual
learning can override that disposition and then modularize it, such that the tt1 is still automatic
but diachronically conceptual.
Self-Reflection
This account of Dual Type Theory as it explains egocentric bias via the acquisition of tt1
and tt2, additionally addresses another empirical aspect of mindreading. The studies which
demonstrate self-reflection as occurring during instances of mindreading has led some to support
a simulation-based hybrid since ST incorporates self-reflection or introspection as a necessary
component while traditional TT does not inherently suggest it (Goldman, 2006). Since selfreflection has been found to be activated in instances of mindreading, a good account of
mindreading should have an explanation of how self-reflection can come into play, which
traditionally has been more obvious for ST than TT. In simulation, introspection is required to
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tag and quarantine one’s genuine states so that the offline module computes only the pretend
states believed to belong to the target. Introspection is also the tool that tags and categorizes the
output of the simulation as a metarepresentational state attributable to the target. While observed
activation of areas believed to be connected to self-reflection may be caused by simulation
during mindreading, this is not the only possible explanation, and therefore does not guarantee
that simulation is our default mechanism. Although self-reflection is not necessary for the
automatic activation of tt1, perhaps it is the tool that attributes the output of the connectionist
network as a metarepresentational state to the target. Similar to its function in simulation, selfreflection is capable of tagging these states and categorizing them. If self-reflection is the tool
tagging and attributing the output states in simulation cases, then similarly the same tool is used
in attributing the outputs from the theory cases. Tt1 produces an output, but it must be attributed
to belonging to the target by some means. Self-reflection appears to serve this function in
simulation, and so could also be that tool in mindreading via theory. If self-reflection is involved
in this way, then we would see activation in cases of mindreading via theory as well. Therefore,
the activation of self-reflection regions in the brain is compatible with theory-based accounts.
Additionally, self-reflection occurs with respect to type 1 processing when an individual
reflects on the success and failure of her processingxxvii. This type of introspection can alter the
weights among the nodes of the connectionist network; a process necessary for reliability.
Accurate attributions will then increase in strength while incorrect ones will cause the connection
to weaken. Also, self-reflection adds symbolic knowledge to her rule-based theory (tt2). If selfreflection can tag pretend outputs, then it can tag and characterize genuine ones too, such that it
could generalize them into our folk-psychology. We can use self-reflection to add to our tt2 by
characterizing some output or genuine state to be representing all humans not just our own case.
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This type of addition to tt2 is responsible for the egocentric bias and facilitated through
introspection. So evidence of self-reflection during mindreading could be cases of reflecting on
the success of the connectionist network for the sake of improving reliability of tt1 or tt2, it could
be the result of tagging genuine outputs as new theories within tt2, or it could be tagging the
outputs of the connectionist network, tt1, as metarepresentational.
Other Phenomena
Some additional reasons for thinking that our mindreading is mostly theory-based include
the cognitively penetrable aspect of attributions, such that our learned theories can greatly
change which attributions we make, in addition to the roadblocks and potential consequences
associated with simulation. Our attributions have been shown to be influenced by new theories of
the attributor (Stich & Nichols, 1992), as discussed earlier; but this is not compatible with
simulation. If we did rely on simulation to make most of our attributions about the mental states
of others, then learning a new theory would not change the output considering our offline module
is responsible for producing the pretend state attributed to the target given the pretend starting
state believed to belong to the target. So, a new theory affecting our attributions is evidence that
simulation is not responsible.
There are also instances in which we cannot or are not motivated to simulate, and this
lack of automaticity might suggest that it is not our default process. The simulation process is
triggered by a “like-me premise;” and the fact that simulation relies on the perceived similarity
between the attributor and target suggests to me that some theory is being activated, and as a
result that activation triggers simulation to occur. The theory behind the like-me premise guides
simulation. Without this theory, simulation would not occur without being motivated (e.g. the
subject is reminded or requested to do so). This phenomenon of failing to simulate based on the
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lack of similarity is observable in studies like that of by Kaufman and Libby (2012), which
demonstrates that perspective-taking increases when the subject believes the target to be like her
as opposed to a member of an outgroup. The fact that we do not engage in simulation with
people we think are not like us, may be evidence that we do not want to waste resources when
the output of our simulation will not be relevant, since the target differs from us. If this is true,
then refraining from simulation in cases deemed too different could show that simulation
requires precious resources, and therefore is effortful. If we have tt1, which is not effortful, and
that mechanism has the appropriate inputs and will be reliable in the current situation (meaning
we are not motivated by accuracy to use limited resources), then we should hold the view that
tt1, not simulation, is our default mechanism, that is, the one that is relied upon most since it
requires less resources, given the cognitive miser theory, which states that individuals will
conserve resources. Additionally, if we do not simulate, then it is not a type 1 process, given that
type 1 processes automatically proceed when the stimulus is present.
Current emotion also has a strong influence over simulation, sometimes making it nearly
impossible, which might give support for why it is not the primary mechanism since there can be
many instances, in which simulation is not achievable. It could be that the emotion has such
intensity that it cannot be inhibited, as when we find out that a parent has died. No matter how
hard we try, it seems like our own situation, in such a case, cannot be ignored; simulating a very
different mental state, like the joy from winning the lottery, seems impossible. Or it could be that
we are depleted of resources from attempting to regulate our emotion, and there are not available
resources left for simulation. However, even in these cases we can still attribute mental states to
other people. Since simulation relies on the inhibition of one’s genuine states, and since
inhibition requires cognitive resources, a lack of these resources or a high demand of these
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resources might affect whether a person indeed simulates. The person still attributes mental
states; and this ability to attribute, even in cases where inhibition of genuine resources is not
likely, is strong evidence that mindreading is executed via theory. Someone who favors
simulation might respond by stating that while simulation is impossible in those cases, for the
most part, it is default. However, these cases show simulation requires resources, and the demand
of resources makes it unlikely that simulation is default, especially when another reliable process
is available and less effortful.
Another reason that might suggest that our primary process for mindreading is tt1 appeals
to the potential negative consequences of simulation. Goldman claims that quarantine failure is
possible when the pretend states and genuine states, which are similar, are confused during
simulation and genuine states are incorrectly fed into our offline modules. It is just as likely that
quarantine failure can also occur on the other side of simulation, that is the pretend output could
be confused and attributed to the mindreader as a genuine state. Theory on the other hand does
not predict this possibility. Quarantine failure of pretend outputs could be problematic, especially
if simulating negative mental states; thus resulting in submitting oneself to those negative mental
states, which have potentially negative side effects such as lower academic performance, worse
memory, physical illness, and affecting subsequent thoughts. Xie and Zhang (2016) found that
positive emotions increased accuracy of face discrimination while negative affections impaired
performance. The risk of quarantine failure happening on the output side of simulation would
allow for such negative effects to occur to the attributor. If quarantine failure is as prevalent as
simulation-based accounts concede, such that, it explains our pervasive egocentric bias, then the
same failure to distinguish one type of state from the other (genuine from pretend, or vice versa)
predicts that simulation of high-level mental states could affect the genuine states of the
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mindreader. If quarantine failure occurs so often in cases of egocentric bias, it could be expected
to occur with outputs as well. If quarantine failure occurred with outputs, we would expect to
observe effects like those just mentioned. However, attributors do not seem to confuse attributed
beliefs or desires with their genuine ones. Quarantine failure could occur if simulating, so we
would expect to see some effects, but we do not. Additionally, these effects could be
unproductive for the subject. Since humans do not face this same threat of quarantine failure with
the outputs, perhaps we do not use simulation as default, but rely on theory.
Dual Type Theory Account
I have argued bits and pieces, here and there, throughout this paper; however, I would
like to bring some of it together to present how the tt1 of a Dual Type Theory Account could be
the default mechanism one uses in attributing higher-level mental states to others. I have shown
that Goldman’s arguments for the primacy of simulation are not as convincing as he hopes and a
Dual Type Theory can equally explain the phenomena. Therefore, I think we should consider
again how cognitive systems select mechanisms in a given situation. In regards to what function
is default, we should accept the idea, “using the least amount of cognitive resources” as a good
marker of which mechanism the cognitive system will select in most cases. Because effort can be
thought of as using cognitive resources, the default process will be the least effortful. If a system
can come to some reliable conclusion using less effort, then there is good reason to think that it
would select this route instead of a more effortful one. I am suggesting that if two processes both
compute successful attributions with decent probability, then a person not motivated to activate
one process over another with regards to accuracy will use the mechanism requiring the least
amount of precious working memory resources.
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Default processes, or automatic, standard processes seem to follow a pattern: using the
least amount of resources but still retaining decent reliability, otherwise another process might
intervenexxviii. If this is true, and if a system has two processes available, and both reliably
mindread, with one requiring less resources than the other, then the system will choose the least
effortful process. Because individuals wish to conserve cognitive resources or do not wish to
exert them in a given case, I am proposing we can identify the default mechanism of
mindreading in this way: if the processes are available and reliable, such that the result of the
process is true most of the time, then the relatively less effortful process will be the one deployed
most of the time, i.e. default. I believe this line of argument has not been pursued to illuminate
the default method of attributing mental states to targets.
Most philosophers hold a hybrid account, one that includes both theory and simulation as
viable mechanisms to attribute higher-level mental states to others, but my bi-level theory, in
conjunction with the effortlessness approach to identifying primacy, offers a new interpretation
for the phenomena. Theory is traditionally thought of as propositional information regarding the
mental habits of others, or a folk-psychology; but there is another way of understanding theory—
as a connectionist network, which represents information via the strengths among nodes within
the network such that some input results in an output based on the regularities of the environment
and the strengths of those weights representing those probabilities. While I think we should
understand theory in this broader sense to include connectionist networks, I do not think that the
existence of the connectionist network can reduce theory to only this neural network. Instead I
propose a Dual Type Theory that incorporates both types of theory based on the evidence that
our learning of new theories can affect our intuitive, automatic mindreading attributions. Under
this account, we have automatic mindreading that is not as intellectualized as traditional theory

53
yet still capable of being influenced by the new theories we learn because of the interaction
between tt1 and tt2 through dual-interventionism and through the learning, or modularization, of
new information from tt2 into tt1. Tt1 provides us with a modularity of mindreading, so that
humans have an innate capacity to mindread, have an effortless tool to accomplish it, and have
an ability to automatize new theories into our intuitive attributions.
From the discussion of the type 1/type 2 distinction, we know that type 1 processes are
less effortful, as those types are often referred to as fast, automatic, and “effortless;” while type 2
descriptions include things such as requiring attention, consciousness, etc. as well as features
like: being slow, serial, and effortful— but what exactly is “effort?” Perhaps a process can be
called “effortful” when it requires attention or cognitive resources as these things are grouped
together and may just refer to different aspects of the same entityxxix. Type 2 processes use
working memory, require attention, are effortful, and conscious; and these different aspects may
influence the others, that is it is effortful because it requires attention, and attention uses working
memory resources. If this is the case, then type 1 processes require less cognitive resources
because they occur without the need for attention, consciousness, or working memory. Type 1
will always run; suggesting that this is always a potential process and could be default since it is
does not rely on some input from high-level control systems (Stanovich 2011). It seems to me
that a requirement of a default process should be easy accessibility such that the process can be
used in every case. As seen with heuristics and cognitive problems like the bat and ball from
Kahneman (2011), people utilize type 1 processing in most situations, which is why we see some
instances of incorrect intuitive responses when we fail to check our automatic answerxxx.
Our connectionist network theory is obviously type 1 and traditional theory a type 2
process, but what about simulation? Simulation involves cognitive decoupling so that we can
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separate our genuine states from our pretend ones and use imagination to simulate the target’s
mental state. It also relies on the “like-me” premise to trigger the simulation, and therefore does
not automatically engage when there is a stimulus. It relies on information from memory to
produce accurate simulations; and it uses resources to inhibit states (as seen in self-regulation).
Cognitive decoupling, is a defining characteristic of type 2 processes and relies on working
memory, so from the features of simulation, it seems that it can be categorized as a type 2
process, or perhaps a hybrid of type 1 and 2. If so, then mindreading via simulation requires a
good amount of resources; therefore, an argument for the primacy of tt1 more likely since it is
the least effortful.
While our automatic intuitive responses get it wrong sometimes, for the most part they
allow the subject to engage in her environment reliably by responding to cues and statistical
probabilities. Both theory and simulation have limitations on accuracy, and therefore have
similar reliability; their accuracies depend on other features and for the most part get it right to a
similar degree. Tt1 maps the regularities found in the environment, and since it adjusts the
weights within the connectionist network to represent the statistical probability of certain stimuli
and resulting outputs, it is reliable in constant environments. Tt1 learns bottom-up, but it is also
influenced, through supervised learning, by the rule-like theory found in tt2; so the accuracy of
the tt1 mindreading also depends on the theory used to shape the tt1 net. It should be reliable if
the tt2 is as well since over time it can reflect the knowledge found in tt2. If a person believes a
bad theory, she will come to an inaccurate attribution if she directly consults tt2 but also from her
intuitive responses that have been affected by her conceptual tt2 knowledge. Simulation is not
without inaccuracy either; if the starting states that are fed into the offline module do not reflect
those of the target, then the output from the simulation will not be accurate. Another factor of
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accuracy for simulation involves the difficulty associated with inhibiting one’s genuine states
such that they do not contaminate the simulation. If quarantine failure occurs and her states are
not separated from the pretend states, then a person will probably attribute incorrect mental states
to the target.
Holding that all other aspects are constant—a task that does not differ greatly from our
usual experience or environment, etc.—if there are multiple mechanisms available to provide the
subject with information about the mental states of others (tt1, tt2, and simulation), with some
requiring more cognitive resources (tt2 and simulation), then the mind will default to the one
with less strain on limited resources (like attention and memory). Unless motivated, a subject
will likely rely on the type 1 theory, but type 2 has the ability to intervene if something triggers it
or she is motivated to use the resources; likewise, she can be motivated to use simulation, and
she relies on simulation when a theory is not present.
Learning
Because it requires the least amount of resources and automatically triggers, tt1 is the
primary mechanism used by people to mindread, that is the one we engage when all processes
are possible and reliable. It is modular and provides us with an innate capacity to mindread, but
the accuracy of mindreading can be affected by tt2 and simulation. Tt1 can learn from the
conceptual knowledge in tt2, such that the theory of tt2 becomes our automatic response. How
exactly would this work?
Our innate capacity for mindreading adjusts the weights among the nodes of the
connectionist module in response to regularities of environment and successful attributions
accordingly. As our networks fine tune these connections through Hebbian learning, that is the
increasing of weights between nodes that are activated together and decreasing the weights of
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those that are not, learning within tt1 is not limited to this unsupervised kind. Supervised
learning is also possible within tt1via the conceptual information of tt2, such that the continuous
presentation of the conceptual knowledge can affect the connections and strengths of tt1. Usual
learning within type 1 processes are slow, that way the information represents the typical
properties of an environment over time (Smith & Decoster, 2000). If a network was altered by
just one trial, it could experience an abnormal case, and the resulting change in the network
would not be an accurate representation of environmental regularities. This worry is avoided
when learning occurs over many trials. On the other hand, type 2 processes can learn quickly to
single instances. The two systems can interact through consolidation, which transfers knowledge
from the fast process to the slow-learning process through repeated presentations (McClelland et
al., 1995); the network still learns over time but via regularities of the type 2 process, not the
environment.
According to Baars (1997), consciousness makes propositional content available to the
modules by bringing the content to the global workplace. Tt2 is a type 2 process, so it is slow
and conscious. If it is conscious, then it has the ability to bring the conceptual content to all the
modules via the global workplace. Tt1 is a type 1 process, and being modular, quick, serial, etc.
it is one of the modules that conscious content is made available to. As with all modules, if one is
susceptible to supervised learning, then this information will affect how it computes. In the case
of mindreading, the conceptual tt2 knowledge will act as examples of correct input and output
computations such that the connectionist network will alter the weights over time to reflect that
knowledge. The learning is possible since tt1 is not content-nonconceptual, but synchronically
state-nonconceptual and can be diachronically conceptual. It is not that the adjusting of weights
requires attention and effort, for learning in tt1 occurs automatically in response to activation of
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nodes, but selecting the correct output through the conceptual knowledge of tt2 does. The
process of learning is automatic within the connectionist network, but the desired output that
exhibits the theory to be modularized must be provided through attention and consciousness to
be accessible to tt1. Over time, the weights will increase among the provided outputs, and less
effort will be needed to provide tt1 with the correct output. For example, consider trying to form
a new habit or break an old one, such as remembering to turn lights off when exiting a room. At
first, one has to remember to turn the light off when she leaves the room, she has to keep that
information available in her working memory in order to execute it because she normally does
not do it. So if it was not in her working memory she would leave like normal without turning it
off. But by attending to that desire, by allocating endogenous attention to it, she is selecting it as
a viable behavior. After she executes it and turns the light off, that behavior becomes more likely
in the future by adjusting the weights among her corresponding connectionist network. Over
time, the amount of attention needed decreases and the action becomes habit, such that she no
longer must remember or make a conscious effort to turn the light off, now it has become
automatic. Tt1 is not just implementing tt2; while it is reflecting that knowledge and is
diachronically conceptual, it is not sentence-like, rule-based information that a classical model
proposes. So our tt1 comes to represent the regularities found in both our environment and tt2,
such that our conceptual knowledge regarding other minds can influence our automatic
attributions, while a simulation-based account cannot explain this.
Developmentally speaking, a modular tt1 provides the capacity to mindread, and more
experience and samples of data from the environment will increase the accuracy of this process.
Young children often over-generalize based on similar features among stimuli while they are
learning which features are associated with one another. The neural nets are still fine-tuning the
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weights among the connections to reflect regularities, and often they attribute mental states to
others incorrectly because they automatically attribute some mental state they have experience
with since they do not have fine distinctions between stimuli. Discussed earlier in the section
about type 1 and 2 processes, type 1 process do not differ among individuals based on cognitive
ability; however, there seems to be a variation of ability among mindreaders. We can explain this
difference by citing the attention and working memory resources necessary to train our tt1 to
reflect our tt2 knowledge. If we learn a new theory but cannot train our tt1 accordingly, the our
tt1 might still be inaccurate. Working memory and attention do vary with intelligence, so those
with higher intelligence will be able to correct and adjust tt1. Other individuals may be executing
tt1 networks guided by wrong/incomplete theories.
Simulation
Accuracy of mindreading depends on the connections of tt1 to reflect regularities of the
environment and our tt2 knowledge, but it can also be aided by simulation. As previously stated,
this is a hybrid account of mindreading; and so both simulation and theory are mechanisms used
to mindread, however tt1 is primary. If a child or adult approaches a novel situation and does not
have the relevant tt1 knowledge, then accuracy is at risk. Since she is motivated, she will use
cognitive resources if she has them. Because simulation requires less resources than tt2, she will
engage in simulation if she does not possess a reliable tt1 network. If simulation is not possible
for whatever reason, she can accept the automatic tt1 response, which most likely has experience
with something similar to the novel case, or she could access tt2 if she has cognitive resources
but unable to simulate because of other factors. If we are lacking a folk-psychology regarding
this scenario, then we must engage in mental simulation for an accurate attribution. Simulation
can also add to our theory and thus increase accuracy of mindreading in general. Once the person
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engages in mindreading and concludes an attributable mental state, that mental state is tagged
and projected to the other person—but it is also tagged and generalized to potentially be added to
the tt2 knowledge regarding the minds of other people. The mechanism responsible for this task
is the same self-reflection proposed by Goldman to attribute and tag states as
metarepresentational (2006). As children go through experiences and learn about self, they can
tag that knowledge as regarding other minds as well; so the foundation of our tt2 is based on our
own experiences and generalized out. That new knowledge (tt2) can now be made available to
the modules, as described above, and train tt1 over time. The generalization of our own
psychology and experiences explains why our theories are laden with egocentric tendencies and
why we exhibit egocentric bias, the demonstration of which has led some to believe that
simulation is responsible. But as I have shown, egocentric bias and other mindreading
phenomena are compatible with a Dual Type Theory Account, an account that incorporates two
types of theory and argues for the primacy of the tt1 mechanism.
Conclusion
Attributing high-level mental states to others is a complex phenomenon that incorporates
both theory and simulation; however, one process is likely used more than the other. Authors
have argued for theory-based and simulation-based accounts, but my Dual Type Theory Account
provides a new approach to understanding aspects of the mindreading phenomenon while
providing reasons to accept theory as the default, or primary, mechanism. By dividing theory
into a traditional database of conceptual knowledge (tt2) and connectionist networks (tt1), we
can explain a multitude of features and weaken arguments previously used as evidence for a
simulation-based account. For example, self-reflection and egocentric bias, both of which are
prevalent in mindreading, can now be explained on a two-type theory-based model, whereas they
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were not obviously implied by previous accounts of theory. At the same time, we avoid the overintellectualized worry about a traditional folk-psychology. With the tt1, we have a modular
mindreading capacity that is still susceptible to supervised learning, thus we can explain why our
attributions are innate but can be cognitively penetrated.
Furthermore, the division of theory into different types illuminates features of each
mechanism, such as the effort required of each. As I have shown, tt1 is the least effortful
mindreading process since it is fast, automatic, and does not rely on working memory resources.
On the other hand, the remaining mechanisms require more resources and are not automatically
engaged. There is reason to believe that individuals select the least effortful process most of the
time; and with regard to mindreading, that process would be tt1. Therefore, there is reason to
believe that tt1 is our default mindreading mechanism on a Dual Theory Type Account.
In addition to the current conversation regarding primacy in mindreading, the Dual Type
Theory Account has many important implications that I will briefly mention. We now know that
our automatic responses when mindreading rely on our experiences with the environment but can
also be guided by tt2 knowledge. When we are motivated, our tt2 can intervene with our tt1
processes, but our tt2 knowledge can also adjust our connectionist networks using attention and
working memory. Therefore, we may draw some practical, albeit speculative, applications from
this new account of mindreading.
There could be a potential opportunity to help individuals improve their mindreading
abilities by teaching correct theories about others’ minds and encouraging supervised learning,
so that the new knowledge becomes modularized and automatic. We can motivate individuals to
access the tt2 knowledge during cases of mindreading and to train their tt1 networks. New
theories are learned from a single instance within tt2, but our tt1 requires more trials. However, if
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we motivate or remind individuals to access the tt2 information during the mindreading process,
then default-interventionism may provide the subject with a more accurate attribution.
Additionally, we could instruct individuals to reflect on past attributions and compare them to
the new tt2 knowledge. Over time, the tt1 networks would adjust. Motivation could be present by
addressing the past theories as obsolete and incorrect (since the best motivator to engage type 2
processes is accuracy).
Similarly, we have a picture of the causes and solution to implicit bias. Implicit bias
occurs when people unconsciously hold biases towards members an outsider group. These types
of judgments suggest that they are not engaging in simulation, since they do not attribute things
that they would attribute to themselves if they were in that situation. Additionally, they would
not engage in simulation because they feel so removed from the target that it would be a waste of
resources. So how do they make those judgements? They are relying on their tt1 networks—
automatic responses that have been shaped by their environment (cultural behavior) and tt2
knowledge regarding some group of people. The more that theory is confirmed, say by a
demagogue who preaches racial prejudice, the stronger that connection becomes in the tt1 of
individuals. Implicit bias is cultural, thus supporting the hypothesis that it is a result of some tacit
theory; however, we potentially have a solution to correct this wrong attribution. We can teach
correct theory (tt2) and provide instructions to access that information over many trials of
outsider group mindreading. But what I think would be more instrumental is to induce
simulation, in which biased individuals simulate the situation of an outgroup person. The
aversion to simulate with people “unlike us” stops individuals from engaging in this mechanism.
However, we can provide vignettes and instruct subjects to simulate the situation and mental
states of the target, whose status, race, gender, etc. is unknown. After the subject engages in
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simulation, she would be informed that the target was a member of an outsider group. The
illusion of “unlike me” would weaken and the simulated output could be generalized and added
to tt2, which then can adjust tt1. This process must, again, be motivated, but has the potential to
slowly correct our biases.
Although these practical implications are only speculative, they demonstrate that the Dual
Type Theory Account provides opportunities to improve and correct mindreading. By
understanding the different mechanisms and how they interact, we also get a sense of how to
increase our accuracy. These solutions and therapies are not readily available on previous
accounts of mindreading and rely on the division of theory into two types, that is an automatic
innate capacity with the ability to alter intuitive responses. While we cannot really know what
someone else is thinking, we can become better equipped at attributing mental states to others
and interact with one another more efficiently and productively.
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Footnotes
i

Although these seem like very different activities, both are included in the mindreading

phenomenon.
ii

The Dual Type Theory is distinguishing between two processes within theory: type 1 and type

2. This distinction is the same as the classic partition of system 1/system 2: type 1 possessing the
same cluster of features as system 1 and type 2 involving the qualities usually attributed to
system 2.
iii

By complex emotion, I mean emotions that are not obvious from only a subject’s perception of

the target’s facial expression. “Complex” meaning dependent on some circumstance or social
quality that is not directly accessible through perceptual appearance alone. In this category are
things such as anxiousness or suspicion. I also mean emotions about certain things, or attributing
reasons for emotions, like being sad about X, as opposed to identifying a person as only sad.
iv

Appealing to the effort required by each mechanism has not been used as evidence for one over

the other. However, the proposed division of theory invites such an argument, as the different
types have varying demands on cognitive resources.
v

For the most part. Some beliefs are not transparent such as ones we have compartmentalized,

blocked out, or possess unconsciously like implicit beliefs.
vi

This distinction between ST and TT as knowledge-poor versus knowledge-rich is rejected by

Goldman (2006). He stated that “there is no reason that creation of pretend states should not rely
on information stored in memory. This does not prevent a cognitive operation from being a
simulation” (p. 150). What makes it simulative is the top-down production of a state with the
purpose of replicating a normally produced state.
vii

False-belief task is also evident in adults, but more so in children.
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viii

While simulation does not rely on a vast database of conceptual knowledge, it does require

cognitive resources more so than my proposed tt1, to be discussed further.
ix

The nodes and connections among them are analogous to neurons and the synapses

respectively. The weights affect the synapses, such that activated neurons could activate or
inhibit another depending on the activation value of each and weights of the connections to that
neuron. This process continues from input nodes to hidden nodes to output nodes, which provide
the network with an outcome or decision. It is not a simple association principle, but differential
equations that guide the system. See Smolensky, 1988a.
x

The outputs are selected as inputs for some other mechanism like the projecting of a mental

state and tagging it as a metarepresentational belief.
xi

Not only are connectionist networks responsive to environmental regularities, but to our tt2

conceptual information, which can alter the weights of a network over time, so they reflect the
information represented within tt2 but accessed automatically and with the least amount of effort.
xii

Known as the “position effect,” individuals will evaluate the two identical items differently,

such that the item on the right was preferred to the one on the left. See Nisbett & Ross, 1980, p.
207.
xiii

Previously referred to as “system 1/system 2” in the literature, “type” is more appropriate by

remaining agnostic about how many systems there are, as opposed to suggesting that there are
only two. For instance, there are many systems (visual system, auditory system) in “system 2.”
xiv

The types often possess these characteristics but do not necessarily need to in order to be

classified as one or the other. On the other hand, defining features are ones that a process must
have to be categorized as type 1 or type 2.
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xv

A bat and a ball cost $1.10. The bat costs one dollar more than the ball. How much does the

ball cost?” Most people intuitive answer ¢10 because we quickly subtract $1 from the total,
however the correct answer is ¢5, but requires type 2 intervention. See Kahneman, D. (2011).
xvi

The output is not affecting the subject’s states because it has been taken offline, but it can be

selected as an input for another task.
xvii

The database of traditional TT relies on vast conceptual knowledge that is not innately given

and appears too intellectualized.
xviii

These different tasks are not as easily accomplished as ST suggests. They are not as

obviously accessible as the mechanism used to extract information from TT theory.
xix

However, self-reflection is expected on my proposed view.

xx

Stating the downfall of the process as difficult may be evidence against it being the primary

mechanism, rather than for it. Default mechanisms are the ones that occur most often, and there
is reason to believe that a process of this type would be effortless.
xxi

Emotion regulation is relevant to discussions of high-level, simulative mindreading as we

must often inhibit our own emotion states when simulating another’s intense sadness for a
deceased parent, for example. Therefore, by showing that emotion regulation requires cognitive
resources, inhibition must also require resources.
xxii

We will see, in the hybrid section, that the role of self-reflection to tag states is also

compatible with theory mindreading. Therefore, its appearance during mindreading tasks is not
obvious evidence for ST.
xxiii

That is, cases that are not motivated to activate an additional process to intervene the intuitive

response.
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xxiv

Phylogenetically speaking, Goldman proposes that ST is more in line with what evolution

likely created. Since simulation consists of using one’s own modules as the model of the target
by running them offline to conclude an output to be projected onto the person in question, some
might consider simulation to be phylogenetically more plausible, and so primary, at least
Goldman does (2006). He states that creating a new module is more work than using the ones we
have in a different way, and so it is more likely that we just use our own thought patterns and
project them onto others instead of developing two separate theories (one for our own mind and
one for the minds of others). However, it is not clear how this is an argument for simulation on
the basis that it would be easier for evolution (or less work), when simulation requires cognitive
resources that could be retained if using tt1.
xxv

Another point by Goldman concerns the ontological aspect of both theories.

Acquisition is not as obvious for traditional TT as that of ST, and Goldman takes this ontological
problem to be stronger evidence for ST as default. Since beliefs concerning myself do not
constitute a folk-psychology, but can guide simulation, Goldman states that acquisition makes
more sense for simulation. However, even small children are capable of creating theories that
reflect, for example grammar or science, and they acquire the relevant knowledge even quicker
than knowledge of folk-psychology (Stich & Nichols, 1992). Moreover, I propose that our tt1
encodes the regularities we encounter with other minds and so develops in that way, fine tuning
with experience, but also is susceptible to our conceptual knowledge of folk-psychology. And
our conceptual knowledge can include generalizations from our own experiences and our
simulations of other people’s mental states. So acquisition with a Dual Type Theory is
explainable and not as difficult as Goldman suggests.
xxvi

See note xv.
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xxvii

This type of reflection is not necessarily conscious.

xxviii

Such as seen in default interventionism, when type 2 processes can intervene the intuitive,

type 1 process.
xxix

As stated earlier, this is open for discussion but not pursued here.

xxx

This is not suggesting that there is some increased fallibility associated with all Type 1

processes that is absent from Type 2 processes. On the contrary, there are times when our Type 1
processes can lead to accurate answers while Type 2 might conclude biased responses (see
Evans, (2007); Stanovich, (2011); as cited in Evans & Stanovich, (2013)).
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Donna thinks
DonutDisturb has the
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satisfy their desires.

Donna will decide to
go to DonutDisturb

KEY
Belief state of the mindreader.
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Theoretical reasoning
mechanism of the
mindreader.

Figure 1. TT mindreading process. Based off the reconstruction by Goldman & Jordan (2013).
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belief

Imagination
faculty
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Figure 2. ST process of mindreading. Based on the model provided by Goldman & Jordan
(2013).

